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ON SOME PROBLEMS OF FEDERAL
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James C. N. Paul t and Murray L. Schwartz t
Recent decisions of the Supreme Court dealing with the constitu-
tionality of restraints on circulation of obscenity have served, paradoxi-
cally, to clarify and to underscore vexing questions in this field of law.
Even more recent decisions of lower federal courts suggest the need for
broad-gauged re-appraisal of federal censorship of obscenity in the
mails.'
This paper constitutes a brief "interim" report on a broader study
of that subject. The discussion traces in outline the development of
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officials responsible for enforcement of the laws under study were interviewed and
appropriate file material was examined. Space here precludes a detailed breakdown
of this work or expression of individual thanks to the persons in government who
without exception extended cordial assistance to our work. But particular acknowledg-
ment must be made of the interest and help extended by Mr. Abe M. Goff, General
Counsel of the Post Office, Mr. William C. O'Brien, Assistant General Counsel, Mr.
James C. Haynes, Chief Hearing Examiner of the Post Office, Mr. David H. Stephens,
Chief of Postal Inspection Service, and to Mr. Huntington Cairns, General Counsel
to the National Gallery of Art, Mr. Irving Fishman, Deputy Collector of Customs
of the Port of New York, who all extended more hospitality and assistance than we
had any right to expect. A number of attorneys and other persons connected with
cases involving enforcement of the postal and customs laws have also extended very
gracious help. We owe a particular debt to Morris L. Ernst, Esq., which we are glad
to acknowledge.
t' Associate Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. LL.B., University
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1. See, e.g., Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 26 U.S.L. WEg!K 2169 (D.C. Cir.
Oct. 3, 1957) (Court of Appeals divided 5 to 3 on validity of postal order barring
nudist magazines from mails; the dissenters argued that the order "is of highly doubt-
ful [constitutional] validity." A petition for certiorari has been filed in this case).
One Inc. v. Olesen, 241 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1957) (sustaining postal order barring an
issue of the magazine Oe, a serious publication for homosexuals, from the mails.
A petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court is now pending in this case 26 U.S.L.
W=xx 3071 (U.S. Aug. 27, 1957) (No. 290)). See also discussion infra, of the litiga-
tion over seizure of erotica imported by the late Professor Kinsey. And see Times
Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 244 F.2d 432 (7th Cir. 1957) (upholding city censor-
ship ban of the film Game of Love against contention that ordinance on its face and
as applied, violates first amendment. A petition for certiorari has been granted and
the decision below reversed unanimously. The Court's decision apparently on the
merits of the issue of obscenity vel non was rendered after the Justices, ex parte,
reviewed the film. See The New York Times, Nov. 14, 1957, p. 40, col. 1).
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obscenity law-particularly federal law-and describes some aspects of
contemporary postal and customs censorship. It then analyzes some
problems involved in defining and justifying restraints on obscenity cir-
culation and explores the recent contributions of the Supreme Court
and American Law Institute in that regard. Finally, it briefly describes
some proposals to be explored in more detail in our study.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW
Since 1842 there have been federal statutes in this country author-
izing federal officials to confiscate obscene matter. The first law dealt
solely with importations from abroad and proscribed only "prints,"
"paintings," "lithographs" and other pictorial matter.2 When it was
enacted there was very little anti-obscenity law in Anglo-American
jurisprudence and no "censorship" statutes-laws allowing govern-
ment officials to exert administrative "prior restraints" against cir-
culation of all things deemed by them to be "obscene." '
The common law did sanction punishment for the exhibition of
some "obscene" creations, though prior to the nineteenth century the
contours of the offense appear vague. The crime seems to have been
lumped with other public affronts against morality-open lewdness,
cursing and blasphemy; thus, the outrageousness of the defendant's
public conduct was the gist of the wrong. In the nineteenth century,
however, obscenity law developed as a field apart, and there occurred
a subtle but basic shift of emphasis. Whereas conduct-the defendant's
2. 5 STAT. 566, 567 (1842). The statute provided for an in rem libeling procedure
in the district court whereby contested seizures would be adjudicated by a judge and
jury. See United States v. Three Cases of Toys, 28 Fed. Cas. 112, No. 16499 (S.D.N.Y.
1843).
3. The earliest meaningful American cases seem to be: Knowles v. State, 3 Day
(Conn.) 103 (1808); Commonwealth v. Holmes, 17 Mass. 336 (1821); State v. App-
ling, 25 Mo. 315 (1857); Commonwealth v. Sharpless, 2 S. & R. (Pa.) 91 (1815).
See also RZv. STAT. MASS. c. 130, § 10 (1836) (punishing publication of obscene ma-
terials). See WHIARTON, CRimINAL LAW 739 (2d ed. 1852). For English source ma-
terial reflecting the status (and lack of it) of "obscenity law" at various periods of
history, see, e.g., Queen v. Read, 11 Mod. 142, 88 Eng. Rep. 953 (1708); Rex
v. Curl, 2 Str. 788, 93 Eng. Rep. 849 (1727) ; HAwKixs, PLAS OF T114 CRowr 355
(Leach ed. 1788) ; Vagrancy Act, [1824] 5 Gao. 4 c. 83, § 4; STEPIHEN, DIGEST OF
CRTIINAL LAW 117 (4th ed. 1887). See ScoTt, INTO WHOSE HANDS (1945), for de-
tailed historical discussion.
4. Indeed it is interesting to note that even during the Tudor-Stuart licensing era
when censorship was in theory total, there seems to have been no standard or partic-
ular focus on obscenity as we know the concept today. Elizabethan and Restoration
drama reflects many instances of bawdiness that goes pretty far for modern audiences.
Prynne's Histriontastix and Jeremy Collier's Short View of Profaneness bear testi-
mony to the fact that there was much that was shocking to 16th and 17th century
audiences and also to the fact that little by way of law enforcement was done to sup-
press it. The famous Vizetelly Memorandum, a protest written to the Treasury De-
partment after works by Zola were banned, lists in great detail titles and citations to
the "obscenity" of the Elizabethan and Restoration dramatists. Excerpts are reprinted
in ERNST & SiAGLg, To Tng PtRz 315-18 (1929).
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public use of obscenity-was formerly the apparent basis of prosecution,
it now became a subordinate element; obscenity was bad per se,- and
virtually any distribution, regardless of motive, audience reached or
actual harm done, was proscribed.
Just one hundred years ago Lord Chief Justice John Campbell
startled the House of Lords with a lurid report: "Bales" of printed
material-"poison more deadly than arsenic"-were secreted in various
London houses whence the stuff was being distributed and hawked in
back alleys and dingy shops around Holywell Street. Campbell pro-
posed a law to suppress this trade-his famous Obscene Publications
Act-which proscribed all circulation of things deemed obscene.
It was enacted," despite sharp debate that foreshadowed problems
to come: What, demanded opponents, is the definition of an "obscene"
book? (The bill supplied none, nor, of course, did the common law.)
Would it be criminal for a respectable bookseller to sell a bawdy Resto-
ration "classic" to a respectable gentleman just because the work hap-
pened to fit the definition, whatever it was? Trust the good sense of
the courts and those who enforce the law, was the response, reinforced
with vigorous pleas for vigorous laws to deal with the Holywell ped-
dlers.
Ten years later Lord Cockburn, speaking for the Queen's Bench
in the famous Hicklin case,' defined obscenity: "The test" was whether
the "tendency of the matter is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds
are open to immoral influences and into whose hands a publication of
this sort may fall." 8 Thus, the law became concerned with "mental
sanitation" of sex expression in the arts.
These English developments-Campbell's Act and Cockburn's
"test"-are of interest because they reflect historically the first real de-
velopment of "anti-obscenity" law. The same pattern unfolded in this
country: Legislatures enacted statutes; courts, sometimes with un-
thinking acquiescence, read the Hicklin standard into them, verbatim.
5. It would appear for example that "anti-vice" societies were very much a prod-
uct of the nineteenth century. Notable examples include the English Society for the
Suppression of Vice, the New York Society for the Suppression of Vice and the New
England Watch and Ward Society. For an interesting protest against early efforts at
anti-vice society book censorship in England, see 13 EDINBURGH Rzv. 333 (1809). The
First International Congress against obscene literature was held in Switzerland in
1893. See 57 THS NATIoN 323 (1893). Thereafter such gatherings became regular
occurrences. For history of the development during the nineteenth century of the copy-
right doctrine prohibiting court recognition of property rights in immoral works, and
for examples of extreme, rather "strait-laced" judical pronouncements applying this
doctrine, see Rogers, Copyright and Morals, 18 MICH. L. Riv. 390 (1920).
6. [1857] 20 & 21 Vicr. c. 83. For the accounts of the debates and passage of Lord
Campbell's Obscene Publications Act, see 145-49 PARL. DEB. (3d ser. (1857)). For
a further contemporary comment, see Lord Broughham's unsigned, hostile article in 3
LAw MAGAZiN4 & LAW R1v. 283 (1857).
7. L.R. 3 Q.B. 360 (1868).
8. See 17 STAT. 598 (1873); L.R. 3 Q.B. 360, 362 (1868).
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Not until 1873 did the federal government really enter the field.9
Then, Anthony Comstock, agent for the newly formed New York So-
ciety for the Suppression of Vice, descended on Congress and waged
a one-man lobbying campaign, one of the most effective of its kind on
record, to push through an omnibus federal anti-obscenity bill, includ-
ing a statute on importation, a statute on distribution of obscene matter
in federal territories and the postal statute which is sometimes still re-
ferred to by his name.' (Indeed, Comstock frequently called it "my
bill.") And in 1879, in the notorious Bennett case,"' a crusty old crank
who published free love tracts was sent to jail, and a Hicklin gloss put
upon Comstock's act; the law was made to read as if it said in terms:
No one shall publish or receive, via the mails, anything which may tend
to corrupt, sexually, the corruptible.
The debates which attended passage of the Comstock Act reflect
only one thing for sure: Congress was in such a hurry to pass the
law-the adjournment hour was pressing-that few congressmen had
much familiarity with the terms of the bill. In retrospect it is too bad
a few more questions and answers weren't spread upon the record, be-
cause, arguably, it is possible that Congress never meant to give the
Post Office the independent censorship power which it soon assumed.
The statute said in effect, "obscene" things "shall [not] be carried"
in the mails; it then provided penalties for those who "knowingly"
sent or received it. Arguably it was drafted as a criminal statute. The
textual structure (viz: obscenity shall not be conveyed and those who
knowingly mail it shall be punished) was very similar to an earlier
statute, the Act of 1865; and it is plain that, this earlier statute was
intended solely as a criminal statute. But apparently after 1873 postal
authorities inferred, despite the absence of express suggestion to that
9. The first postal statute on obscenity was enacted in 1865 after very little de-
bate. 13 STAT. 504 (1865). It was a criminal statute, aimed at individuals who were
supplying soldiers with obscenity. The wording in substance (though not in detail)
was quite similar to the act of 1873. The short Senate debates attending its passage
made it very clear, however, that the Senate intended it to be only a criminal statute.
See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 450, 654, 660-62, 965-66 (1865). For accounts
of Comstock's activity in securing passage of the act of 1873, see BROUTN & LEEcH,
ANTHONY COMSTOCK (1927) which relies on, and quotes extensively from Comstock's
own diary. For the legislative sources, see CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 3d Sess. 1240,
1307, 1358, 1371, 1436, 2004 (1873). See also De Grazia, Obscenity and the Mail: A
Study of Administrative Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 608 (1955).
10. It is now 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1956). The Comstock Act is a verbose statute;
it also covers abortifacient and "filthy" matter which are considered as non-mailable
categories apart from obscenity and subject to different standards. See United States
v. Limehouse, 285 U.S. 424 (1932); Consumers Union v. Walker, 145 F.2d 33 (D.C.
Cir. 1944).
11. United States v. Bennett, 24 Fed. Cas. 1093, No. 14571 (2d Cir. 1879). For
the influence of the Bennett case, see Rosen v. United States, 161 U.S. 29 (1896). The
Comstock Act was declared to be constitutional in the sweeping dicta of Ex parte
Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1878).
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effect in the debates, the additional authorization to exercise an inde-
pendent civil program to enforce the proscription. 2
In any event, a federal censorship operation was developed over the
years. Mail deemed "obscene" was stopped in transit. The sender
might be prosecuted: that was up to the Justice Department. But
regardless of the criminality of the mailing or whether the United States
attorney agreed that it was obscene, the Post Office exercised the power
to ban any book offensive to its interpretation of the standards.
Since Congress had defaulted on the definition of obscenity and the
courts seemed to sanction indiscriminate use of the Hicklin formula,
the law was enforced, not only against pornography, but also against
illustrious creations of human expression. One federal judge opined
that even the Bible might be "obscene," and a customs official confis-
cated a copy of Michelangelo's Sistine Chapel rendition of the Last
Judgment."3 Postal and customs censors in Washington proscribed
works by Ovid, Apuleus, Aristophanes, Rabelais, Boccacio, Voltaire,
Benjamin Franklin, Anatole France, James Joyce, Havelock Ellis, and
Freud.14
12. A recodification of the statute in 1876 declared that obscenity was "nonmail-
able" and was not to be "conveyed" or "delivered" by the Post Office. 19 STAT. 90
(1816). This implies a "censorship" power, but if so it was bestowed with no debate
over the problem by Congress.
The point stressed here is not that the Post Office is today acting illegally.
The long period of congressional silence plus recodifications which more plainly imply
an independent civil censorship sanction, plus congressional augmentation of this power
(e.g., by enactment of 39 U.S.C. §259(a)), plus court approval, sub silentio, of the
independent postal censorship power have put a gloss on the statute. In the recent case
of Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 26 U.S.L. WEFK 2169 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 3, 1957),
a divided full bench of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld the
statutory power of the Post Office to stop "obscene" mail in transit, though three dis-
senters doubted whether the Comstock Act really does authorize this power and if so
whether it is constitutional.
The point stressed here is that when Congress enacted the Comstock Act, ap-
parently no real thought was given to the question whether the statute authorized an
independent "censorship" program as well as criminal enforcement of the proscrip-
tion. There was a fleeting objection to customs censorship when Senator Casserly,
pointing to the expansion of the importation prohibition to cover "obscene books,"
voiced doubts as to "whether it can be left to officers of the Customs House to deter-
mine what kind of literature ... is to be admitted." This objection was withdrawn, ap-
parently when the Senator learned that all material seized by customs officers was to
be produced in court for in rem, libel proceedings, thus curtailing (in theory) the
scope of administrative discretion. CONG. GLOB, 42d Cong., 3d Sess. 1436 (1873).
Compare the discussion of earlier postal legislation, cited in note 9 supra, and note
that apparently neither the act of 1865 nor the recodification of 1872, 17 Stat. 302,
was intended as a civil, "censorship" type statute; yet the Comstock Act followed the
same textual structure of these earlier statutes when it declared: "That no obscene
. . . book, pamphlet, [etc.] . . . shall be carried in the mail, and any person who
shall knowingly deposit [such things in the mail shall be guilty of a crime.]" 17
STAT. 598, 599 (1872). Compare the evolution of the lottery and fraud laws, where the
first sanctions were plainly both civil and criminal. 17 STAt. 322 (1872).
13. See ScHRoEmzR, "OBscaNE" LITERATURE AND CONSTITuTIoNAL LAW 65 (1911);
HAIGHT, BANNED BOOKS 12 (1955).
14. For contemporary secondary source material reflecting the extent of customs
and postal censorship and controversy over it prior to 1930, see, e.g., SCIROEDPR, op.
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Some of these, of course, were "sport" decisions; all portrayed the
extremities which could be reached when the law was loose. In 1929,
Congress for the first time seriously discussed this sort of censorship
and the concomitant dangers to freedom. A proposal to jettison the
tariff prohibition calling for confiscation of "obscene" books was nar-
rowly voted down, but the provisions for court review of customs seiz-
ures were tightened and a special exemption added giving the Secretary
of the Treasury some discretion to permit non-commercial importa-
tion of obscene "classics and books of recognized and established lit-
erary or scientific merit." ' And thereafter, federal courts interpreting
the obscenity statutes-notably in the renowned Ulysses litigation-
revised the legal "test" in an effort to curtail the censorial scope and
impact of the law.
Smarting from the sting of the Ulysses opinions, the Bureau of
Customs undertook a unique administrative experiment-the employ-
ment of an advisor to bring a sort of special, cultural expertise to bear
on its determination of what constituted obscenity. The Post Office
failed to follow suit, despite suggestions that it do so, yet a number
of earlier, controversial bans on mail circulation were discarded.'6
But during the early forties the Post Office mounted a new attack
on magazines, and again the dangerous possibilities of overextended
censorship were exposed. The power to revoke second class permits-
implied perhaps, but nowhere expressly authorized in any statute-
was-invoked against some seventy-odd offenders (including old barber-
shop staples like Police Gazette and Judge) apparently on grounds of
their obscenity. 7 This did not stop the burgeoning of that breed of
cit. supra note 13; HAIGHT, op. cit. supra note 13; DEN ETWHo'S OBSCENE? (1930);
ERNST & SEAGLE, op. cit. supra note 4; Gilford, The Customs Men Keep Us Pure, 59
Ntv RI PUBLIC 176 (1929); Weeks, The Practice of Censorship, 145 ATLANTIC
MONTHLY 17, 21 (1930) ; 9 CONO. DIG. 50 (1930) (reprinting Senator Cutting's attack
on Tariff Act enforcement).
15. Tariff Act of 1930, 46 STAT. 688, 19 U.S.C. § 1305(a) (1952). The debates
over its enactment covered the period October 1929-February 1930 and are scattered
through volume 72 of the Congressional Record; See 72 CONG. Rtc. pts. 3, 4, 5, 6
(1929-30).
16. The Bureau's advisor is Mr. Huntington Cairns. For an account of his back-
ground and work with the Bureau, see CHAVEZ, GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNI-
CATIONS c. 13 (1947). See also ATTORNZY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCzDURE, THE POST Ovrics DEPARTMENT 32-33, 95 (1940) (hereinafter cited as
THE POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT); id. ADMINISTRATION OF THE CUSTOMS LAWS 116-22
(1940). For a discussion by Mr. Cairns of obscenity problems, see Cairns, Freedom
of Expression in Literature, 200 ANNALS 76 (1938).
17. Material reflecting widespread use of the revocation sanction during the period
1940-1944 is to be found in files of the American Civil Liberties Union now located
in the library of Princeton University; see, e.g., Vol. 2349, at 63, 77, 235; Vol. 2435,
at 139; Vol. 2436, at 74. These materials contain correspondence between publish-
ers, postal officials and ACLU staff members as well as press releases. See also the
critical speeches of Senator Langer, 89 CONG. RFc. 3820-24, 4328-34 (1943), discus-
sing this phase of postal censorship and listing titles of banned magazines.
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publication, and court decisions may have suggested doubts as to
whether many were, in fact, "obscene" under the legal tests. But the
Post Office attempted to enlarge the scope of its revocation power in
order to deal with the danger of publishers who proffered such
prurience. A second class mailing provision is a subsidy and should
only be awarded as a "certificate" of publisher's "good moral charac-
ter," wrote Postmaster General Walker in 1942."8 And shortly, the
Post Office Department revoked the second class mailing privilege of
Esquire magazine, claiming statutory authority to do so (and thus
authority to cripple if not destroy its circulation) because the magazine
was not for the "public good," even though it was conceded that its
content was not "technically obscene." The Supreme Court, inter-
preting the statutory qualifications for second class rates, declared that
the Post Office had acted illegally; the decision rejected the "hoary
dogma" 19 that use of the mails is a privilege which Congress can reg-
ulate at will; it even cast some doubts about the power to revoke mail-
ing privileges on grounds of past publication of obscenity."0  And, in-
deed, the Department abandoned, for the time being at least, use of that
sanction to force compliance with its interpretation of the law.
The Esquire case and decisions like Parmelee v. United States2'
and Walker v. Popenoe ' reflected considerable court recognition of
the dangers of national censorship of vital channels of communication
pursuant to standards which were vague, however well motivated.
And indubitably, during the past decade the courts have liberalized the
law. But there has been no solution of all problems.
So long as the law calls upon customs and postal officials to stop
the circulation of any and all "obscene" publications, so long as courts
define obscenity in imprecise terms of sexual stimulation or excessive
indecency, so long as writers-good or bad-write about sexual ex-
periences with realism and at the sacrifice of the modesty or euphemism
of customary expression, so long as "cheesecake," or nude photography,
or "spicy" magazines and even pornography are big business growing,
bigger despite outraged outcries against their existence, so long as both
the serious arts and those dedicated more to pure pleasure giving-de-
pict sex in the way they do-so long as these conditions obtain there
must be pressures and counter-pressures. The problem remains: How
to frame laws, sound in substance, fair in procedure, which will protect
18. PosTAAsTER GENERAL, ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1942, at 12 (1943).
19. See Justice Harlan's opinion in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 76 (1957).
20. Hannegan v. Esquire, 327 U.S. 146 (1946). Compare Public Clearing House
v. Coyne, 194 U.S. 497 (1904), with Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1878).
21. 113 F.2d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
22. 149 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
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against "harms" assumed to exist and yet preserve freedom-freedom
of expression, freedom to publish and circulate, freedom to read.
SOME PROBLEMS REFLECTED IN RECENT EXPERIENCE
At least since World War II, postal and customs "censors" have
utilized two "tests" to determine whether a book or a picture is "ob-
scene."
The first, derived from the Ulysses case,' involves measuring the
libidinous effect of the work on the reader. Will the work, judged as a
whole and with regard to its artistic or educational purpose and merit,
stimulate "lewd" thoughts or "sexual feelings" in the normal adult
reader?
The second, derived from an early dictum of Learned Hand 24 and
decisions like Parmelee v. United States, has reference to the com-
munity's "standard" or "conscience" on -what is tolerable and what is
too outrageous depiction of sexual behavior or nudity in art or litera-
ture. In the phrase of Judge Hand, "the word obscene" is taken to
"indicate the present critical point between shame and candor at which
the community may have arrived here and now."
Space permits no examination, here, of procedures used to apply
these criteria and enforce the postal and tariff laws. In essence, cus-
toms exercises a sort of primary jurisdiction over mail from abroad,
impounding (for potential forfeiture proceedings in court) every impor-
tation which it detects and deems "obscene." 2 The Post Office also
exercises an impounding power over books and pictures found in the
domestic mail-its "nonmailability" sanction.2 In addition, in appro-
priate cases, it is empowered to cut off incoming mail addressed to per-
sons who are using the mails to advertise or sell works which the De-
partment says are obscene-sometimes called the "mail block" sanc-
tions.
23. United States v. One Book Entitled Ulysses by James Joyce, 72 F.2d 705
(2d Cir. 1934).
24. United States v. Kennerley, 209 Fed. 119, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
25. Tariff Act of 1930, 46 STAT. 688, 19 U.S.C. § 1305 (a) (1952). In theory the
statute simply authorizes the Bureau to seize suspected obscenity and produce it in
court for an in rem, de novo proceeding looking towards forfeiture of the material.
In practice, when the Bureau decides to seize, the importer is notified and asked to
"assent" and "waive" court proceedings. This "notice" is quite brief and does not spell
out the importer's right to a jury trial to contest the "seizure" with the burden on the
Government. In most cases the "assent" is given. In some it is ignored, but even here,
in the absence of a court contest by the importer, the forfeiture proceedings are a
pure formality and the court never examines into the merits of the case.
26. 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1952).
27. 25 STAT. 873 (1889), as amended, 39 U.S.C.A. §§ 259(b), (c) (Supp. 1956).
See Summerfield v. Sunshine Book Co., 221 F.2d 42 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 349
U.S. 921 (1956), for discussion of constitutional problems raised when "mail blocks"
are applied to cut off a publisher's mail service it; toto, even though he is using the
mails to disseminate lawful matter as well as an allegedly "obscene" work.
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By dint of court compulsion, the Post Office began, in 1951 to
exercise its "mail block" sanction via procedures complying with the
Administrative Procedure Act.2" In "nonmailability" cases, perhaps
again by dint of conpulsion, a new statement of procedures has just
been promulgated. It appears to bring "nonmailability" cases under
the act. 9 The Bureau of Customs makes no attempt to follow the act
since in theory, by virtue of the terms of the Tariff Act, each of its
decisions is reviewable de novo in the district court (though in practice
very few seizures are contested or reviewed de novo at this level).
Even when and if formal postal hearings are held, there is uncer-
tainty as to precisely what evidence is to be heard. Most of the cases
decided under the Administrative Procedure Act thus far have involved
pictorial matter. In determining whether the pictures evoke sexual de-
sires or violate the community standard, the Post Office relies upon
"inspection" of the challenged work by its "judges" (the hearing ex-
aminers) to yield the answer. The opinions of art experts or psy-
chologists are seldom invited or admitted. For who is to judge their
probative weight or value? " Similarly, if a book suspected to be
"obscene" is referred to Washington by a customs collector or post-
master for informal adjudication and a possible impounding order,
the question of obscenity vel non is judged with little if any recourse
either to outside expert testimony or to the circumstances involved in
the actual case. The work is inspected and the officials decide,
hypothetically, whether, if normal Americans were exposed, it would
28. Door v. Donaldson, 195 F.2d 764 (D.C. Cir. 1952). See Cutler, The Post
Office Department and the Administrative Procedure Act, 47 Nw. U.L. REV. 72
(1952). Cf. Walker v. Popenoe, 149 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1945). Prior to the Door
case, the Post Office took the position that obscenity vel non was a question to be
judged simply by "inspection" of the material, and thus that the determination was not
subject to the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 STAT. 240, 5 U.S.C. § 1005 (1952).
Considerable support for this proposition is to be found in the Acheson Committee's
monograph. See THE. POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT 29-33.
29. For court action compelling this course see cases cited note 28 supra and note
74 infra. For the new rules on nonmailability cases, see 22 FED. REG. 8999-9000 (1957).
In effect each "nonmailability" case is now initiated by filing a notice of the Assistant
General Counsel's ruling with the Chief Hearing Examiner. This serves as a "com-
plaint" which the mailer may contest via formal hearings. Recommended decisions
by the hearing examiner on "periodical publications" must be made within forty-eight
hours after the hearing. Note that these rules ignore the doctrine of Walker v.
Popenoe discussed in text at note 73 infra.
30. This observation is based on interviews with the Chief Hearing Examiner of
the Post Office and examination of case records in his files. See the Department's
statement of its position in the Acheson Committee's monograph. THE POST OFFICE
DEPARTMENT 95. Paradoxically, when the Post Office went after Irving Kaw, a
vendor of various works depicting scantily clad girls wrestling, beating and torturing
each other, it produced a psychiatrist at the hearing as part of its case to prove the
works were "obscene." Ordinarily the Department does not, and says it is not required
to offer such proof. Cf. Volanski v. United States, 247 F.2d 842 (6th Cir. 1957)
(error to admit psychiatric evidence to prove obscenity where evidence is limited to
showing "effect that pictures would have on sadists . . . and other types of sexual
deviates").
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so titillate or shock them as to produce the assumed "harms" which
the obscenity laws are designed to prevent.
Usually it matters naught that the actual recipient of the work
might be a mature person with some particular interest in the work in
question, who, in any event, is perfectly well equipped to regulate his
own tastes in reading and control his psychic responses to sex expres-
sion. The present premise of obscenity laws-a heritage of the Vic-
torian era-is that there are some books which no one should be allowed
to see. This in the interest of protecting the public at large. Censor-
ship acts today on precisely that premise, and, of course, far more effi-
ciently than criminal law enforcement.
True, as an act of grace, the Post Office will sometimes make ex-
ceptions in an exceptional case-releasing an "obscene" work to a
doctor or some other qualified recipient who particularly needs it for
professional purposes. And pursuant to the Tariff Act, the Bureau
of Customs can exercise discretion (nominally reposed in the Secretary
of the Treasury) to release "classics" or books of "merit" when im-
ported "non-commercially," but this dispensing power is conservatively
construed and niggardly exercised."
Several years ago the late Dr. Kinsey, in the course of one of his
research projects, tried to import various samplings of erotica from
abroad. Most of these importations could by no stretch come in under
31. "Provided further, that the Secretary of Treasury may, in his discretion, ad-
mit the so-called classic or books of recognized and established literary or scientific
merit, but may, in his discretion, admit such classics or books only when imported for
non-commercial purposes." 62 STAr. 862 (1948), 19 U.S.C. § 1305(a) (1952).
Importers are- given no formal notice of their right to petition for discretionary
release of seized material. There are no published regulations reflecting criteria used
by the Bureau to decide (a) whether a book does enjoy the status of a "classic" or has
"established and recognized literary or scientific merit," (b) whether a particular
importer enjoys sufficient status to obtain release of the work. The Bureau construes
the statute to mean that the "merit" of a work must be "recognized" and "established"
in this country, though this construction hardly seems required by the text of the
statute, let alone by the apparent legislative intent.
Examination of Bureau file material reflecting the handling of the various works
of Dr. Edward Fuchs on the history of sexual morality reflects the difficulty of judg-
ing questions (a) and (b) above. On many occasions since 1931 various Americans
have attempted to import these works which were published in Vienna and written
in turgid German prose but which are well loaded with all sorts of illustrations, some
extremely erotic, a "parade" of "obscenity" in the words of a former official. The file
material shows that respectable opinion can be mustered for the premise once avowed
by a Bureau official that "these books" are "decidedly of a shady [i.e., pseudo-scientific]
character." Contrariwise, statements in the files by doctors, sociologists and librarians
(including a former librarian of Congress) hold that the works are scholarly and the
pictures highy relevant and useful to the text. At various times the Bureau seems to
have barred the book altogether because of its lack of scientific status. The work has
been confiscated from the household effects of several, obviously literate Viennese
refugees entering this country; it has been taken away from many other importers
who presented no scholarly credentials to the Bureau. On the other hand, it has been
released, for example, to a psychiatrist, a law professor (whose field was domestic
relations), a Ph.D. student of art history, and a lawyer whose only avowed interest
in the work was that he was a book collector and an intellectual but who threatened
showdown litigation if he didn't get what he wanted.
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the secretary's discretionary release power as presently construed. So
the Bureau seized this material. Kinsey was barred, because an ex-
ception in his case would seem to require exceptions in others; difficult
administrative problems might be encountered, and the whole concept
of the law might have to be revised. Kinsey's successors have now
carried his fight to the courts. 2 The case poses a nice conundrum.
But if Kinsey's case is unique and extreme, others are not.
American students of literature can't import the forbidden, unexpur-
gated works of D. H. Lawrence or Henry Miller, though these books,
published in France and smuggled about pretty widely, have received
a good deal of high praise from distinguished critics.- No American,
in theory, can have access, via the mail, to the autobiographical reveries
of DeSade, let alone Frank Harris-though surely these works, too,
may have some place in our culture if the volume of words written
about them is any index.
Since 1940, applying the standards noted above, the Post Office
has stopped mailings of the following books, among many others:
From Here to Eternity; The Woman of Rome; For Whom the Bell
Tolls; Strange Fruit; Appointment in Samarra; Diana; Memoirs of
Casanova; Tobacco Road; God's Little Acre; The Second Sex and
Mademoiselle Fifi. Each of these titles was involved in a case referred
. 32. See, e.g., 170 PUBLISH RS WEEKLY 786 (1956) for discussion of this case.
Very recently the district court (S.D.N.Y.), announced its decision with an opinion
as yet unreported, releasing the materials on the ground that, as to the recipients,
there was no danger from release, and the materials should not be treated as obscene.
We are advised informally that the Government wili appeal. Post Office rulings dated
October 1, 1952 and April 28, 1952 reflect that the Department has released books
otherwise deemed "obscene" to Dr. Kinsey solely because Dr. Kinsey was the
recipient.
33. No attempt here is made to cite scholarly and other writings about Lawrence,
Miller, Harris, De Sade and other authors of "banned" books. Henry Miller presents
an interesting case, however, because the Bureau also refuses to admit his "obscene"
works under the secretary's discretion on the ground that they have no literary stand-
ing in this country. Our correspondence with the chairmen of the English Departments
of Pennsylvania, Princeton, Harvard, Yale, Cornell, Columbia and Brown Universities
and Dartmouth, Williams and Swarthmore Colleges on Miller's standing here as an
author suggests at least some basis for the contrary conclusion. And see the bibliogra-
phy of favorable comment on Miller by English speaking authors in PERLIs, My
FRInND HsRY MILUER (1956), including praise by Orwell, Eliott, Pound, Edmund
Wilson and Aldous Huxley. Of course it must be emphasized that the courts have
recently found Miller's books obscene. See, e.g., Besig v. United States, 208 F.2d 142
(9th Cir. 1953), which certainly confirms the Bureau's ban on importation (though
not necessarily the ban on discretionary releases).
34. These rulings (except for From Here to Eternity and The Woman of Rome)
are reflected in nonmailability rulings in the General Counsel's files dated, in order
of mention in the text: Dec. 29, 1941; May 5, 1944; Sept. 24, 1941; Dec. 24, 1941;
April 8, 1941; March 25, 1941; Jan. 28, 1953; March 23, 1953; May 17, 1954. Infor-
mation on From Here to Eternity and The Woman of Rome (which were banned
in 1955) was supplied by counsel for the publishers. For spirited attack on rulings
like these and on postal censorship in general, by a lawyer who successfully won
reversal of a recent nonmailability order banning Aristophanes' Lysistrata, see De-
Grazia, supra note 9, at 608.
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by some postal employee in the field. In each a postal lawyer read the
book and concluded that it was "obscene"-unfit for circulation via the
mails, to the public.
It might be that today some of these rulings would be repudiated
if new, contested cases arose, although the Department's files reflect the
fact that they are still current. And of course it should be emphasized
that, as a practical matter, the "ban" imposed in each of these cases was
probably of negligible impact, for the law as interpreted in Washington
depends upon consistent, widespread enforcement at the local level if it
is really to be implemented. Since book rulings made in Washington
are not circularized locally and since few postmasters-absent suspicious
circumstances-have any desire to read and "censor" books offered for
mailing and since postal lawyers themselves don't make any effort to
implement such controversial rulings beyond the particular case in-
volved, the dangers to freedom, if any, are more theoretical than real.
Nevertheless, in theory, each ruling reflects the Department's conclusion
that each of those books is unfit for adult Americans, that no seller
should be allowed to advertise or sell it by mail and that no book club
should attempt its distribution to members.
Postal policies on pictorial nudity-even when displayed in ex-
pensive art books-have posed problems. For example, a Philadelphia
bookseller, specializing in the photographic arts, imported an expensive
folio of nudes entitled Art International, containing pictures by the
world's leading photographers. He offered it for sale via ads in repu-
table photography magazines. He was warned, with threats of "mail
blocks" or worse by local officials, that the work might be obscene.
When he protested to Washington, the Department confirmed: "This
office has consistently held that photographic nudes are nonmailable,"
wrote the general counsel, and, again: "The photographic nudes in
this book are indecent according to the moral standards of the
nation." 15
The Philadelphia case typifies many others. Photos of nudes, good
or bad, are regularly banned from the mails-unless sandwiched in very
small numbers between the covers of an otherwise respectable publica-
tion. But even respectable publications can be censored. The magazine
Scientific American was threatened with a ban until it removed from
35. The ruling is reflected in a nonmailability order dated April 16, 1955; addi-
tional information and correspondence relating to the case was furnished by the book-
seller. The Post Office files reflect many similar rulings. On the other hand books
featuring drawings and paintings of nudes seem generally to pass. But a woman who
imported the privately printed Paintings of D. H. Lawrence in connection with her
work on a biography of Lawrence was not allowed to receive it. Ruling dated May
16, 1951. Barrington's Anthropoinetry and Anatomy for Artists, though cleared by
Customs was banned by the Post Office's ruling dated April 30, 1954.
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its cover a young, female native of New Guinea, clad above the waist
only in flowers.3 6
The Bureau of Customs (which cleared Art International) is
more liberal about nudity in photos. Whereas postal lawyers have
insisted that virtually all photo art or cultist magazines featuring
pictorial nudity are "obscene," the Bureau admits many such publica-
tions into the country." Tests for banning them seem to turn on
suggestiveness of the pose, lack of retouching, etc. It is impossible to
verbalize only formula; Bureau offioials admit their vexation and dis-
agreement with the Post Office and among themselves, in attempting to
decide when an array of photographic nudity becomes contraband; one
interviewed in San Francisco admitted they were "loose as a goose."
The Bureau also censors foreign movies brought into the United
States for commercial distribution. The morality of a plot and theme is
seldom questioned, and in many other respects the standards are most
liberal (e.g., when judged either by the Hollywood "code" or by re-
ported cases reflecting state and local-censorship experience). But in one
respect a rigid line is drawn. The Bureau methodically requires ex-
purgation of virtually all nakedness, no matter what the context or
artistic merit of the scene. This on the theory that nudity, no matter
how presented, violates an assumed community standard on what is
acceptable undress in movies. The fact that different communities
may have different standards, that nudity may or may not be artistically
relevant-just as with its depiction in books-that it may be delicately
handled rather than commercially exploited by exhibitors, and that
commercial exhibition of movies can easily be locally policed seems to
make very little difference.38  Again, the assumption is that circulation
36. Ruling dated December 3, 1953. Information was also furnished through cor-
respondence with the publisher. The December 1953 issue of the same magazine was
held up in New York because local officials questioned photos of nude male and female
Amazon tribesmen; these photos were later cleared by Washington. Ruling dated
.December 11, 1953.
37. These observations are based on interviews and inspection of case files dealing
with nudist materials as well as inspection of confiscated material. There is also evi-
dence that Customs officials in the ports of entry will sometimes turn material over
to the local post office to be judged by the stricter postal criteria. Cf. Sunshine Book
Co. v. Summerfield, 128 F. Supp. 564 (D.D.C. 1955); United States v. 4200 Copies
Int'l Journal, 134 F. Supp. 490 (E.D. Wash. 1956), wherein two different judges
engaged in yeoman efforts to articulate the difference between obscene and non obscene
photos of nudes; criteria having to do with the age and sex of the model, distance
from the camera and disclosure of genital organs were adduced.
38. Nearly all commercially imported entertainment films come in through New
York, and all are inspected. A short memo describing each film is prepared by the
viewer, and objectionable material is described in more detail. The decision on seizure
(either of the whole film or, more frequently, just short excerpts) is made de facto
in New York although Bureau officials in Washington are advised by letter and memo
of each proposed decision and formally authorize the proposals of the New York
Deputy Collector. This "movie censorship" work is done in a very businesslike, fair
way, making every allowance for the importers' desire for speedy action, and thus far
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of anything which meets the definition of "obscenity"-judging the
thing by some hypothetical "typical" American audience-must be
stopped.
The discussion above reflects some facets of the obscenity "censor-
ship" problem. There are, however, other aspects which can't be
ignored.
Commercial exploitation of pinup magazines, photos of nude
women, "girl wrestlers," "stag movies," "bizarre erotica," paperbound
fiction portraying and emphasizing sexual acts, sex sadism and lust,
and other matter ejusdem generis, is a fact of life today. 9  The mails
are a major avenue of intercourse for this commercial traffic. A dealer
in "stag" stuff needs little capital investment: a supply of wares to sell,
a mailing list of prurient minded, potential customers (and these have
been built up in the trade over the years) and perhaps a few ads in a
"girlie" magazine (which shows how the "girlies," though largely
banned from the mails, can and have become an integral element in mail
order exploitation of salacity).
Since the dealer sends both his direct mail advertisements and his
products in sealed letters, they cannot, as a practical matter be detected
in transit. Moreover, most of these "operators" do business from the
Los Angeles, Chicago and New York areas; experience indicates that
unless they sell actual pornography or something pretty close to
pornography, it is often hard to persuade jurors in those cities to
convict them of a criminal violation of the Comstock Act. But postal
censorship, while apparently not much of a deterrent, does stop a lot
of this trade. Inspectors investigate suspicious enterprises by respond-
no importer has seen fit to challenge the Bureau in the courts. But ef. Excelsior Pic-
tures Corp. v. Regents, 26 U.S.L. WEEK 2081 (N.Y. Ct. of Appeals Aug. 6, 1957)
(holding that the nudist picture Garden of Eden, despite its nudity, was not "obscene"
for censorship purposes. Cf. Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 244 F.2d 432
(7th Cir. 1957) (upholding a total ban on the film Game of Love). This case was
reversed by the Supreme Court without opinion but after inspection of the film.
See note 1 supra.
39. Discussion of this subject is based on, inter alia: interviews with the Chief
of the Postal Inspection Service and various postal inspectors and other postal offi-
cials; examination of material in the Hearing Examiner files; study of the various
reported hearings of Senator Kefauver's Sub-Committee of the Judiciary Committee
Investigating Juvenile Crime. See also NEw YORK STATE JOINT LEGISLATIVE Com-
MITT4E STUDYING PUBLICATIONS AND DISsEmiNATioN OF OVXNSIVE AND OBSCENE
MATERLAL (1957); id. (1956); id. (1955); id. (1954). Material in the possession of
this committee was also revealing. See, e.g., WAGNER, PARADE OF PLEASURE (1955) ;
ELLIS, FOLKLORE OF Szx (1951) ; SOROxiN, THE AME1ICAN S X RZVOLUTION (1956)
for scholarly comment and description of this aspect of contemporary American life,
each author representing a different approach toward the danger it presents. For an
interesting history of the development of the so-called "sophisticated" (and more ex-
pensive) girlie magazines like Playboy, Tiger, Gent, Gem, Dude, Nugget and others
see the long article captioned Racy Reading in Wall Street Journal, April 19, 1957,
p. 1, col. 1. This discussion traces the phenomenally rapid growth in circulation-
entirely via newsstand sales (for they invariably are "nonmailable)-of these maga-
zines. For example, Playboy's circulation was reported at 900,000.
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ing to ads, or getting on "sucker lists" through the use of fictitious
names or by otherwise procuring samples of advertising and things
sold. When appropriate proof is adduced, the Department starts "mail
block" proceedings. Through default or by affidavit promising dis-
continuance or as a result of formal administrative adjudication, most
offenders are put out of the challenged line of business. But new
businesses pop up to supplant those defunct, to cater to the public's
prurient tastes.
By flitting from enterprise to enterprise, Dorothy Tager-an
unabashed female vendor of pictures of nude females, operating along
the West Coast-parlayed an investment of a few thousand dollars into
an annual gross running into millions.4' The notorious Irving Kiaw
grossed $1,500,000 selling photos, drawings and movies featuring
women beating or torturing women. Samuel Roth grossed thousands
selling "strip sets," "wolf pacs," a publication called Good Times and
many other items obviously designed to cater to salacity.
41
Foreign dealers can, by the same technique, exploit American
prurience. Paperback fiction-much of it quite pornographic-can
be advertised and sold via the mails. The exporters themselves are
beyond the reach of our criminal law. And, as a practical matter,
criminal prosecution of importers is usually unwarranted or out of
the question and thus no deterrent.4 Customs censorship is the only
effective curb on the traffic. It apparently frustrates most foreign
exploitation of the United States market, though precisely how
effective it is, no one can say.
The above description of recent federal experience probably
reflects, too, a good many of the problems confronting state and local
law enforcement, for much of the "obscenity" which may flow into a
community, may flow in via channels which are beyond local policing.
And all this suggests that our obscenity laws pose something of a
dilemma. On the one hand restrictions have been and are being put
upon interests protected by our "first freedom," particularly the free-
dom of adults to decide for themselves what they are to read. On the
other hand businessmen, for money making purposes, are exploiting
commercially various species of "speech" which, when disseminated
on a mass scale to audiences recklessly solicited via methods deliberately
40. Her unpublished but detailed "Autobiography," loaned to us by Mr. James
Bobo, former counsel to the Kefauver Committee recounts the history of this business.
This paper is in the committee's files.
41. See, e.g., 169 PUBLISHMRS WimxLY 241 (1956); id. 1035; 170 id. 617 (1956).
42. The Government must prove "knowing" importation. 18 U.S.C. § 1465 (Supp.
III, 1956). Customs officials in the ports studied do not remember ever referring any
importation cases for possible prosecution. See note 1 supra.
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calculated to wet one's appetite for salacity, may work social harms to
be avoided-although the precise effect which "bad" sex expression
works on persons exposed to it is unknown.
Indeed, this void of knowledge magnifies the dilemma. For a
search through "scientific" literature and the testimony of experts on
witness stands apparently yields no consensus which will help answer
questions of this sort: "John Doe is a mature adult; he wants to buy
and read The Memoirs of Fanny Hill (that grossly pornographic tale
obviously written to titillate, to cater to prurience-but a book which a
university librarian recently labeled a "classic" when he asked the
Bureau of Customs to release it). If John Doe reads Fanny's Memoirs,
what harm will befall? Will John Doe become "corrupt," "promiscu-
ous," "outraged" or upset from "psycho-sexual tension" (as various
theories voiced at various times would suggest) ? Does the fact that
Fanny Hill is a sort of "classic" make it more or iess harmful? If
Doe reads it will he suffer any more or less than if he reads something
even more patently pornographic? Or Rabelais or Solomon's Song?
Or if he contemplates pictures of undressed girls arrayed in a magazine?
Or a movie? Or accounts of sex crimes splurged pruriently in a
tabloid? Or DeSade?
There is, to repeat, no accepted answer to these questions. The
writings of some psychiatrists suggest that if Doe, though an otherwise
mature "adult," were "sex:ually immature," contemplation of such
material-or some of it-might encourage him to indulge in "regres-
sive" fantasies, and continued contemplation might tend to "arrest"
his sexual development. Similarly, others suggest that it might stimu-
late some people, particularly adolescents, to masturbate which also may
tend to arrest development. Others admit the masturbation point but
deny harmful effect. Some psychiatrists insist that some people-
especially adolescents-are seriously influenced by material depicting
sexual "sadism!' or "masochism" or "fetishism." Similarly with
material depicting acts of physical cruelty. But the Kefauver Com-
mittee reports: "Majority opinion seems inclined to the view that it is
unlikely that crime and horror comics would lead to delinquency in a
well adjusted child." The most exhaustive "expert" study of the
available, reputable psychological evidence concludes that there is no
conclusion: We simply can't isolate the impact of one book as opposed
to another, nor can we generalize about any class of books, nor about
any of the various media to which we are exposed. The American
Law Institute's Model Penal Code draftsmen surveyed the "scientific"
literature and reported that "there is no psychiatric consensus." And
again: "We know little or nothing about the consequences of reading
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obscene or shocking literature." Two legal scholars who have also
surveyed the literature found no evidence "of a single effort at genuine
research" to "test" any "assumption" about the "effect of sex literature
upon sex conduct." The Kefauver Committee's report reflects the same
uncertainty: Obscenity must be assumed to exert a bad influence,
particularly on many juveniles, but evidence is admittedly lacking. And
the United States, arguing in behalf of the validity of the Comstock
Act, admitted the absence of evidence and was careful to avoid premises
which assumed that there was proof of a particular cause and effect
relationship."
On the other hand, in view of the void of scientific knowledge, it
seems unreasonable to be dogmatic either way on whether there is a
need to exercise some control over obscene and pornographic expres-
sion. Many of the harms which have been singled out as the law's
target may very well occur in some situations as a result of obscenity
circulation. There may be undesirable and otherwise avoidable "psycho-
sexual tension" or "promotion of lust" when obscenity is made freely
available to all by business panderers-to adolescents, to sexually mal-
adjusted people, to people who crave it. Some sort of triggering
impact on the behavior of these people may more likely result, as some
law enforcement officials have claimed. When sensitive people, against
their consent, are exposed to filthy or erotic expression, some psychic
harm may occur. When commercial exploiters of erotica are given free
rein to sell whatever they choose to whomever they can entice to pur-
chase by whatever means, then the law may have licensed dangerous
activity. And also activity which few, at some degree, if any com-
munities will tolerate.
What then is the best approach to the dilemma and particularly
to the problem of the mails? Attention turns to recent contributions
from the American Law Institute and the Supreme Court.
43. For psychiatric discussion, see, e.g., Testimony of Dr. Benjamin Karpman
and Dr. George W. Henry before the Kefauver Committee, reprinted in Nlw YORK
STATU JOINT LGiSLATrsV COMMITTFrs STUDYING PUBLICATION Or AND DISSEMIiNA-
TION OF OFFINSIV AND OBSC"NE MATERIALS 59-66 (1956); WERTHAII, SzDUCTIOX
OF THE INNOCENT (1953) ; Abse, Psychodynamic Aspects of the Problem of the
Definition of Obscenity, 20 LAW & CONEMIP. PROD. 572 (1955); Eliasburg,
Art: Immoral or Immortal, 45 J. CRim. L., C. & P.S. 274 (1954); KARPMAN, THE
SEXUA. OFfENDR AND His OFFENSgS 360 (1954). For the views of psychologists,
see, e.g., KiNsxY, SExUAL BEHAVIOR IN THr HUMAN FZIAL4 662 (1953); KINSSY,
SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN TH HUMIAN MALE 510 (1948); JAHODA, Tin IMPACT OF LIT-
gRATuiR 15-16, 22-23, 30-33, 44 (1954). Dr. Jahoda vigorously attacks Dr. Wertham's
thesis that "comic books" "cause" delinquency. See also the unpublished summary by
Dr. Jahoda of her views which appear verbatim in Judge Frank's opinion in United
States v. Roth, 237 F2d 798, 815-16 (2d Cir. 1956). See also for general discussion
on the impact of reading, WAPnEs, BwEisoN & BRADSHAW, WHAT READING DoEs
To PEOPLE (1940). For the views of the Kefauver Committee to the effect that no
definite conclusion can be drawn on the causal relationships between mass media and
juvenile crime, see S. Rip. No. 62, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1956); S. Rip. No. 130,
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THE MODEL PENAL CODE'S APPROACH
Last Spring the American Law Institute brought forth its tentative
Model Penal Code proposals on obscenity. The quest was for a
rational statute, and one which would "reflect changes in men's views
of the importance of freedom of expression. . . . "  Comments ex-
plaining it re-evaluate the function of such laws, and the code itself
offers a new definition of obscenity.
Perhaps the underlying premise of the ALI proposal is reflected
in these excerpts: "Psychiatrists and anthropologists see the ordinary
person in our society as caught between normal sex drives and curiosity,
on the one hand, and powerful social and legal prohibitions against
overt sexual behavior. The principal objective of [the statute] is to
prevent commercial exploitation of this psychosexual tension." [Empha-
sis added.] And again: "Society may legitimately seek to deter the
deliberate stimulation and exploitation of emotional tensions arising
from the conflict between social convention and individual's sex drive."
Thus: "The gist of the offense we envisage, therefore, is a kind of
[commercial] 'pandering.' "'
Consistent with this end the code re-defines "obscenity": "A thing
is obscene if, considered as a whole, its predominant appeal is to
prurient interest, i.e., a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or
excretion, and if it goes substantially beyond customary limits of
candor in description or representation of such matters." "
Since the law's paramount objective, as avowed by the code's
draftsmen, should be to stop commercial "pandering," the code might
have limited its prohibition to precisely that kind of dissemination of
"obscenity" (as the term is redefined), plus perhaps a ban against all
(except, perhaps, parental or educational) dissemination to adolescents.
This course would have the merit of curbing the more demonstrable
dangers which obscenity circulation may produce, while still preserving
a maximum freedom for mature adults to regulate their own reading
85th Cong., 1st Sess. 127 (1957). For the views of laymen who have studied the liter-
ature on the subject, for the purpose of evaluating premises advanced to justify sup-
pression of books, see, e.g., Alpert, Judicial Censorship of Obscene Literature, 52
HA~v. L. REv. 40 (1938) ; ALI, MODEL PENAL CODE TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 6, at 22-27,
32 (1957) ; Lockhart & McClure, Literature, The Law of Obscenity and the Constitu-
tion, 38 MiNN. L. REv. 295 (1954); McK ON, MERTON & GrLLHORN, FtEDOm To
READ 72-75 (1957). See also Brief for the Appellees, p. 54, Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 474 (1957). The opinion of many law enforcement officers to the effect that
there is a nexus between juvenile crime and "obscene" publications are set forth
throughout the various published hearings of the Kefauver Committee and the reports
for 1953, 1954, 1955, 1956, and 1957 of the New York State Joint Legislative Com-
mittee, supra.
44. See ALI, MODEL PENAL CODE TENTATrV DRAFT No. 6, at 5-9 (1957).
45. Id. 10, 14.
46. Id. § 207.10(2).
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as well as a broader freedom for writers, publishers and booksellers.
This course was considered but rejected on the gounds that it was
impossible to define a "pandering" offense.
Instead, the code proscribes all dissemination except: (1) "dis-
semination not for gain" among adult "personal associates," (2)
dissemination "not for gain" among juveniles, and (3) dissemination
to "institutions" and "persons" having "scientific" or other "special
justification" for receiving." There is also a novel mens ra to the
offense: the defendant must circulate with knowledge of the "obscene"
character of the work or with "recklessness" in that regard; though
there is a presumption in favor of this mens rea upon proof of other
elements, it can be rebutted by evidence of honest mistake in judgment
or ignorance. Thus, indirectly, the mens rea elements tends to confine
criminal liability to the "pandering" type offense which is the code's
target.
48
These proposals surely make valuable contributions by rational
appraisal and identification of the "harms" which the law should seek
to prevent, by offering a new definition of obscenity (the merit of which
is described below) 4 by inclusion of a mens rea defense, and especially
by expressly creating privileged, dissemination transactions. Of course,
as a practical matter penal law has seldom concerned itself with the
transactions which the code now expressly exempts. But federal
censorship has (e.g., notably in Kinsey's case), and introduction of these
ALI criteria into postal and customs interpretation of the law would, no
doubt, promote the interests of freedom.
There remains the problem, however, whether, at least as far as
censorship is concerned, these changes go far enough.
47. Id. § 207.10(4) ; id. 14-15.
48. Id. 49-52.
49. The following excerpts from the code's comments may serve to point up the
purpose and contribution of the proposed new test. "The commonst [sic] definition
of obscenity in the cases is in terms of tendency of the material to arouse sexual
thoughts and desires or to corrupt the morals, meaning in this connection the sexual
morals, of the reader or viewer." Id. 19. "As an independent goal of penal legislation,
repression of sexual thoughts and desires is hard to support. Thoughts and desires
not manifested in overt antisocial behavior are generally regarded as the exclusive
concern of the individual and his spiritual advisors." Id. 20. "We reject the prevailing
test of tendency to arouse lustful thoughts or desires because it is unrealistically broad
for a society that plainly tolerates a great deal of erotic interest in literature, adver-
tising, and art, and because regulation of thought or desire, unconnected with overt
misbehavior, raises the most acute constitutional as well as practical difficulties." Id. 10.
"The proposed [Model Penal Code] definition of obscenity has three elements: (i)
the material must appeal to prurient interest in sexual matters; (ii) that aspect of its
appeal must predominate over other attractions or values in the material; and (iii)
the appeal to prurient interest must be by description or representation going substan-
tially beyond customary limits on free expression. Although obscenity has rarely, if
ever, been defined as we propose in terms of appeal of the material rather than its
tendency, the terms we employ are not novel, and the idea often appears in discussion
of what is obscene." Id. 29.
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RECENT JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS
In the early spring of 1957 a unanimous Supreme Court wrought
the demise of Hicklin oriented obscenity standards. The Court in-
validated a Michigan statute which incorporated Cockburn's "test"
almost in terms.0 It then proceeded to set down three additional cases
for argument: a Comstock Act prosecution, a California prosecution
under a typical state anti-obscenity criminal statute, and a prosecution
under a New York statute authorizing courts to enjoin future sale of
books found "obscene." In each case the statute offered no definition
of the term "obscene"; in each the sole issue to be reviewed was the
validity of the law on its face.
The federal prosecution involved the notorious Sam Roth. Over
the protest of the late Judge Jerome Frank, the court of appeals affirmed
his conviction of peddling a book called American Aphrodite."a The
trial judge had given a Ulysses type instruction-does the work "con-
sidered as a whole," have a "tendency to excite lustful thoughts" in the
mind of "an average person"? And also a "community standard"
instruction-"you judge [the work] . . . by present day standards.
Does it offend the common conscience of the community"? "
Judge Frank wrote, in essence: 54 We are midpoint in the twentieth
century, and it is high time for reappraisal of the anti-obscenity laws
in the light of experience, science and today's legal conception of the
right of free speech. I doubt the constitutionality of the Comstock Act.
Obscenity dissemination, a ridiculously vague crime, punishes people
for selling books or pictures which may only evoke "lustful thoughts"
and nothing more. This is carrying governmental suppression too far.
Reviewing what scientific evidence he could muster, Judge Frank
urged that there was no demonstrable nexus between lustful thoughts
and resultant misbehavior-no proof that obscene books produce mis-
conduct. In the absence of this proof, said he, the law should make
no attempt to suppress the expression. Noxious it may often be, but
experience with the persecution of good books once thought to be bad
should sober the urge to rid the community of all we now label as
50. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
51. Alberts v. California, 352 U.S. 962 (1957); Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown
352 U.S. 962 (1957) ; Roth v. United States, 352 U.S. 964 (1957).
52. 237 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1956).
53. Record, p. 25, Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
54. While labeled a concurrence, Judge Frank's opinion was in essence a dissent
based on his "difficulty in reconciling the validity of [the postal statute] . . . with
opinions of the Supreme Court uttered within the past twenty-five years, relative to
the First Amendment as applied to other kinds of legislation." And see his similar
opinion in Roth v. Goldman, 172 F.2d 788, 790 (2d Cir. 1948). For an attack on the
philokophy of Judge Frank's opinion, see Schmidt, A Justification of Statutes Barring
Pornography From the Mail, 26 FORDHAm L. Rlv. 70 (1957).
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lascivious trash. For some "obscene" creations may have some en-
during merit. Let all alone as the price of freedom-unless and until
we can identify that obscenity which not only seems worthless, but
which also presents some tangible danger of resultant crime or delin-
quency-more clear and more present than mere stimulation.
A divided Supreme Court disagreed with this analysis and sus-
tained each statute.6 Justice Brennan wrote for the majority in
Roth's case. Obscenity, he noted, could be variously defined. In his
opinion the new, untried ALI definition (identifying obscenity as that
which "predominantly appeals to prurient interest") focuses on the
essence of its badness-the fact that its predominant appeal is to
"morbid" or "lascivious" longings. But, said he, laying down a propo-
sition which seems patently inconsistent with the expressed philosophy
of the Model Code proposal,"6 the "appeal to prurience" formulation
was only another way of stating the old, traditional tests, the definitions
utilized by the trial court in Roth's trial (i.e., "tendency to excite lustful
thoughts" or "offensive to the community's conscience"). Any or
all of these formulations of the "test" seemed acceptable to the Supreme
Court. Arguments on unconstitutional vagueness were swept aside,
summarily.
Having thus defined obscenity, the Court's five man majority
proceeded to endorse the proposition that all publications meeting these
criteria are useless to mankind and warrant no protection under the
first amendment. Obscenity, said Justice Brennan, is "utterly without
redeeming social importance." So whether its circulation creates a
"clear and present danger" or no real danger at all is irrelevant. Like
libel, obscenity can be suppressed without proof of its impact on
behavior.
Just as the Court summarily disposed of the vagueness and clear
and present danger arguments, so it disposed of a third. Amicus Morris
Ernst,5" longtime opponent of sex censorship, strongly argued that a
combined reading of the first, ninth and tenth amendments shows
there is no federal power to regulate the content of "speech" for the
purpose of protecting morality. Again the answer was: "obscenity"
is "not expression protected by the first amendment."
55. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Alberts v. California, 354 U.S.
476 (1957); Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957). The Roth and
Alberts decisions were treated together in single opinions by both Justice Brennan
and the dissenting and concurring Justices.
56. See note 49 supra.
57. Mr. Ernst enjoyed the distinction of being permitted to file a brief in his own
behalf and in his own name. It is devoted principally to the argument noted above.
This point was also raised for petitioner Roth by his own counsel.
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The same basic premises underlay Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown 5 8
which sustained the New York statute authorizing court injunctions.
Justice Frankfurter, for the majority, wrote: "If New York chooses
to subject persons who disseminate obscene 'literature' to criminal pros-
ecution and also to deal with such books as deodands of old, or both,
with due regard, of course, to appropriate opportunities for the trial
of the underlying issue, it is not for us to gainsay its selection of
remedies."
All of this did not sit so well with some Justices. As Justice
Harlan noted: "The Court seems to assume that obscenity is a peculiar
genus of 'speech and press' which is as distinct, recognizable and clas-
sifiable as poison ivy. . . . I cannot agree that any book which tends
to stir sexual impulses [etc.] . . . is utterly without redeeming
social importance." And surely experience, at least with application
of the now approved obscenity standards in federal censorship cases,
supports the conclusion.
Embracing the late Justice Jackson's view of the interrelationship
of the first and fourteenth amendments, Justice Harlan concluded that
the constitutional limitations on state power to deal with obscenity, as
opposed to those on federal power, were quite different. State proscrip-
tions were to be judged by their reasonableness, but there is no federal
power to regulate the content of sex expression in the interest of pro-
tecting morality.
Chief Justice Warren, concurring in the result in Roth and
dissenting in Kingsley, insisted that blanket proscriptions against all
dissemination of obscenity were invalid. In essence he would uphold
suppression by criminal prosecution and perhaps by prior restraint
(though that is not clear) only when the disseminator engages in
conduct amounting to "pandering" and commercial exploitation of the
obscenity.
Devout in their belief that the words "no law" in the first amend-
ment mean "no law"-no law which punishes speech independently of
its demonstrable harmful effect-Justices Black and Douglas seemed
to insist that the "clear and present danger test" must be met before
publishers could be jailed because of the content of their work.
Justice Brennan, in a somewhat surprising shift, dissented in
Kingsley. The vice of New York's "prior restraint," as he saw it,
was its failure to guarantee a jury trial on the issue of obscenity. Only
with this "safeguard" could there be assurance of "competent applica-
tion" of the "obscenity standard" (pursuant to the criteria endorsed
in Roth's case).
58. 354 U.S. 436 (1957).
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Justice Brennan's jury trial, constitutional caveat in the Kingsley
case suggests interesting questions about future obscenity litigation in
the Supreme Court. Who on the present Court will vote to sustain
what kind of a law? Suppose, for example, the constitutionality of
postal censorship was precisely the issue; not criminal enforcement of
the Comstock Act, but administrative enforcement via "mail blocks"
or "non-mailability" orders?
Two Justices (Black and Douglas) seem to say there can be no
suppression of any sex expression-even when we characterize it as
"obscene"-without evidence of a "clear and present danger" of harm
from its publication. One Justice (Harlan) seems to say: no federal
power: the states can use criminal or civil sanctions, but the federal
government cannot. One Justice (Brennan) seems to say: jury trials
are a sine qua non to assure fair enforcement of the law (and, of course,
postal censorship supplies none). A fifth member of the Court, the
Chief Justice, who dissented in Kingsley, says: "It is the manner of
use that should determine obscenity. It is the conduct of the individual
that should be judged, not the quality of the art or literature. To do
otherwise is to . . . violate the [first amendment]. . . ." But
the standard here espoused is by no means the standard reflected in
postal censorship. On the contrary, books, magazines and pictures
have been banned from the mails regardless of the "manner of use" or
the "conduct" of the publisher.
Thus, it is very possible that the announced views of five members
of the Court, divergent as they may be, suggest the conclusion that
postal censorship, as now practiced, is unconstitutional.
But analysis of the problem should not stop there. Other factors
suggest the need for modification of the Court's approach to the
obscenity problem-at least when it comes to examination of constitu-
tional limitations on censorship restraints.
In the first place (and recognizing that labels should not be used
as "self wielding swords" " in analysis of first amendment problems),
there is the fact that censorship is a "prior restraint." It is practiced
outside the courts. Policies and criteria are fixed and applied by rela-
tively few officials, operating in Washington, removed from the var-
iances of local community tolerance and attitudes, removed from direct
accountability to juries. Their decisions, in theory, (more so than in
practical effect), can be of quite sweeping importance, e.g., no one can
circulate Hecate County via the mails, and this even though United
States attorneys may and have declined to prosecute booksellers who do.
59. See Justice Frankfurter's opinion, Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S.
436, 441 (1957).
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Criminal enforcement of the Comstock Act has a more limited
impact. Conviction of one individual in one case for selling a book
does not necessarily bar another from selling the same work elsewhere,
or even in the same locale. Further, because criminal law administra-
tion is less streamlined and more inefficient than censorship-hedged in
as it is by all the traditional protections accorded the accused and all
the practical obstacles which frustrate prosecutors-criminal law en-
forcement is less likely to result in suppression of more innocuous
publications, less likely to interfere with limited, discreet circulations of
a work which censors might well find "obscene" and thus ban in toto.
These practical facts of law administration can make a great differ-
ence in net results. And, confining our attention to federal anti-
obscenity enforcement, it is clear that they have. Criminal enforcement
usually operates, today, with much less impact, much more selectively
against the more flagrant commercial disseminators and those who
purvey outright pornography.'0
In the second place, it seems apparent that the Court's prevailing
opinion about what is obscenity and when and why it may be suppressed,
requires some further analysis and qualification.
Sweeping assumptions were invoked by Justice Brennan and his
four colleagues to support their conclusion that Congress has the
power to put people like Sam Roth in jail. Eschewing appraisal of
existing experience, the Court in effect said: (1) "obscene" publications
can be identified and distinguished from legitimate art and sex expres-
sion without much risk of much mistake; (2) "obscene" publications
(as identified by applying the standards) have no social value what-
soever.
Passing the question whether these assumptions are accurate in
light of what we may know about federal criminal anti-obscenity en-
60. In the course of field studies connected with our study, United States attorneys
who handled obscenity prosecutions in New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, Philadelphia
and San Francisco were interviewed. As far as large scale commercial operations in
obscenity are concerned, the first three cities are the most important because most
major mail operators work from these locales. While it is impossible to generalize
broadly, an investigation of major cases involving commercial dissemination brought
in these districts indicates some variance between what prospectors think jurors will
think is obscene and what postal officials think is obscene. A disseminator of pictorial
matter featuring female nudity, if detected, will almost invariably run afoul of the
civil sanctions. But criteria for prosecuting him suggest that something more than mere
nudity is required, e.g., lack of retouching, highly suggestive poses and widespread
commercial distribution. In the Roth case the jury acquitted Roth for mailing nudes
though the prosecutor made a special plea that they fix "a standard" that would outlaw
such pictures. The Post Office's non-mailability files reflect instances where the United
States attorney has declined prosecution of a shipper of books (e.g., a case involving a
book containing excerpts of De Sade's works, a case involving God's Little Acre)
which the Department thought were obscene. Perhaps close to 50% of the criminal
prosecutions under the Comstock Act involve more or less "private" mailings of home-
made pornography or filthy, scurrilous letters.
19571
'238 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 106
' forcement, it seems plain they just do not ring true as characterizations
of experience under censorship.
The Post Office and the Bureau of Customs cannot agree about
pictorial nudity-how much is too much for the good of the public.
They seem to disagree on some fictional works. The Post Office censors
some magazines which apparently sell openly in respectable newsstores
in respectable communities. The Bureau of Customs insists that
virtually all depiction of nudity in foreign films be blotted out-this on
the assumption that there is some uniform condemnati6n of nudity that
offends every "community's conscience." Both agencies have banned
some books which many Americans think are worth the time of mature
adult readers.
Who is wise enough to say that Lady Chatterly, the forbidden
works of Ovid, Miller, De Sade and Frank Harris, Hecate County,
God's Little Acre, From Here to Eternity, The Woman of Rome, or
Mark Twain's 1601, and many others which have been proscribed, are
"utterly without redeeming social importance"? Who is confident
that he can demonstrate that some or all of these books are or are not
"obscene" under the existing standards which purport to tell us what
obscenity is? 6" The Library of Congress carefully preserves copies of
books seized by the Bureau and even makes many available to the
general public. And if the law is to operate on the assumption that all
"obscene" works are fit for oblivion, why did Congress, legislating in
1930, speak of "obscene" "classics" and "obscene" books of "recog-
nized literary merit"?
The portrayal of "sex," admitted Justice Brennan, "has undis-
putably been a subject of absorbing interest to mankind through the
ages"; freedom to discuss or portray it is guaranteed as an element of
freedom of speech, and the courts must practice "ceaseless vigilance"
to assure that freedom. But there the thought was left dangling, and
the exhortation, too. For we are also told that if you portray sex in a
manner which others will evaluate as an "appeal to prurience" or in-
citement of "impure sexual thoughts" or an offense to the "community's
conscience," then you have created something automatically worse than
worthless. As if these collections of words ("inciting impure sexual
thoughts," etc.) were self-executing formulae, handed down from
61. The case of Hecate County is a good example. The Post Office apparently
bans it. The Bureau of Customs, reversing itself (when an importer represented by
counsel threatened litigation), cleared it in 1954. The Supreme Court split four to
four (with Justice Frankfurter out) reviewing a New York prosecution which chal-
lenged the validity of a state court decision finding that the work was obscene. Double-
day v. New York, 335 U.S. 848 (1948). The book was recently cleared by a California
judge in criminal prosecution (according to information in the Bureau's case file on
the book).
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Sinai as the supreme test of the existence of something worthy of any
mature man's contemplation.
A SUGGESTED APPROACH TO POSTAL CENSORSHIP:
SUBSTANTIVE STANDARDS
Space precludes more detailed discussion here of the constitu-
tionality of federal restraints. Despite possible criticisms of the result
in Roth, or some of its reasoning, the fact remains that the Court has
upheld criminal restraints. There may still be quite serious doubts
about the validity of censorship as now practiced. Yet it may be fair
to assume, in light of Kingsley, that if the operation were changed so
as to meet, at least in part, objections voiced by Chief Justice Warren,
Justice Brennan or Justice Harlan (or all of them), the Court might
well find a majority to sustain it.
Moreover, it is probably only realistic to assume that for the time
being the public and Congress will demand that the Post Office continue
to exercise civil sanctions to keep obscenity out of the mails. Revela-
tions reflecting the scope of mail order businesses in erotica, the growth
of the "girlie" magazine business and other serious aspects of the
problem may be invoked to point up the need for continued civil as well
as criminal sanctions, particularly in view of the difficulty which
prosecutors say exists in securing jury verdicts in the areas where so
many distributors do business. It is most important to remember that
many of these "publishers" are motivated by profits; many, like Sam
Roth, will apparently skirt the threat of jail just as close as they can, in
the course of efforts to stimulate prurient interest and thus sales in the
salacity which they offer. It is important to remember, too, that local
law enforcement is virtually powerless to police out of state businesses
which use the mails or the'channels of foreign commerce.
In any event, for present purposes we put aside personal predilec-
tion on the question, is it desirable to continue mail censorship?
Assuming (1) that Congress can, constitutionally, provide for civil
restraints and (2) that it will wish to do so, there remains the problem
of limiting censorship to the imposition of curbs on only the more
demonstrable dangers produced by obscenity in the mails.
The trouble with most obscenity laws today is that they operate
on the premise that once something can be classed as "obscene" then
nobody should see it. Not even adult, educated citizens.
The dichotomy which holds that a work is either fit or unfit, has
been foisted on us by the historical development of the law. It is
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this premise-particularly when enforced via federal censorship-which
makes controversial decisions a matter for real controversy. There
would be less concern over a decision that a given work was "obscene,"
if the law stopped acting on the assumption that all dissemination must
cease once the epithet is fastened on the work.
In view of men's ignorance, prejudices and oft demonstrated
fallibility in this field, why not strike a compromise? Cease the
attempt to forbid all circulation of obscenity. Forbid circulation only
when the transaction-the manner of circulation-involves conduct
which more justifiably permits governmental interference.
Thus, we would start by accepting the definition of "obscenity"
now promulgated by the Supreme Court (although it is to be hoped
that there will be future recognition of the fact that the ALI "test," now
apparently amalgamated into federal law, is not just a reformulation of
old standards but rather a new test with a different emphasis).62 For
in view of the Supreme Court's decision, and in view of the difficulties
with other proposals (for example, definitions couched in psychiatric
terms, or in terms of the clear and present danger test),' it is probably
unrealistic to plump for any drastic reformulation of the definition.
So let us assume that the term "obscene" indicates a work which,
judged "as a whole," violates the community standards, produces
sexual desires and predominantly appeals only to prurient interest.
With obscenity as only one element of the case, a second, equally
indispensable, should relate to conduct: the "manner of use," as Chief
Justice Warren put it. The problem is whether we can identify, with
sufficient precision, alternative kinds of dissemination which justify
suppression.
Tentatively at this point-with recognition of at least some of the
troubles involved-the following classification is offered:
(1) Knowing circulation of obscenity to adolescents. This
conduct should be prohibited in the interest of according protection to
the immature and protection to parental prerogatives and rights. It is
one thing to assume (or operate on the risk) that adults should have
freedom to choose the books they shall read, and another to insist that
children shall have the same freedom. It may be more reasonable to
assume more likelihood of harm to the individual here, even though the
62. See note 4 supra. See also the comments of the draftsman to this effect,
Schwartz, Criminal Obscenity Law: Portents From Recent Supreme Court Decisions
and Proposals of the American Law Institute in. the Model Penal Code, 29 PA. B.A.Q.
8 (1957).
63. See, e.g., Eliasburg, supra note 43; Commonwealth v. Gordon, 66 Pa.
D. & C. 101 (Q.S. 1949).
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scientific proof is lacking; certainly the public is not prepared to accept
the risk. The spectre of a purveyor of pornography peddling outside
a school house without restraint is an extreme example of conduct
intolerable to most parents, and the purveyor who seeks out youth via
the mails is only a step removed-more in space than degree. At the
same time, the law should not attempt outright prohibition of all
distribution when there may only be a possibility that adolescents will
be reached (e.g., as in the case of a magazine publisher whose product
may reach youngsters for all he knows). This would be imposing a
burden on publishers equivalent to maintaining the law in its status quo.
Commercial vendors certainly should be restrained from selling reck-
lessly to an unseen audience, but that should be accomplished by a
second, alternative standard of proscribed conduct.
(2) Commercial exploitation of obscenity. Contrary to the ALT,
we would permit, as far as censorship is concerned, booksellers and
publishers to use the domestic mails to sell works which, when judged
in the abstract, might fit the definition of obscenity. At the same time,
we would recognize the necessity for restraints on this kind of dis-
tribution. Left subject to no control, businessmen can-they do now-
deliberately use obscenity in a way which increases the likelihood that
its distribution will work harms to be prevented-e.g., circulation to
adolescents, exploitation of "psycho-sexual tensions," reckless distribu-
tion of erotica for use as "aphrodisiacs." This business conduct should
be curbed. The trouble here is probably less with the desirability of the
objective than with defining and delimiting conduct constituting "ex-
ploitation." Recognizing that difficulty, we believe that at least as far
as restraints on commercial mail distribution are involved, it may be
possible to draw a reasonable line; at least there should be exploration
of the possibility.
(3) "Assaulting" people with obscenity. The prohibition here
relates to deliberate exposure of people to obscene expression against
their consent, without justification and under circumstances which
involve a likelihood of mental disturbance-serious affront, shame,
fear or disgust. For example, consider the crank (who may be far
from harmless) who sends a mash letter or postcard or other communi-
cation which is scurrilous and filthy to a sensitive woman-this kind of
conduct, while perhaps often the product of mental disorder and seldom
a matter appropriate for censorship, should be prohibited so that it
can be policed.'
64. Perhaps a controversial example of this problem is United States v. Gundel-
finger, 119 F.2d 1023 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 617 (1941) (conviction for vio-
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The first and third categories above may present less difficulty
than the second. But the second deals with commercial vending-the
big problem today, and the situation most usually encountered in
censorship enforcement. What more precisely constitutes "exploita-
tion," in the sense of prohibited commercial vending?
The conduct proscribed should be defined in terms of the harms
to be avoided.
As noted, we see minimal danger in discreet distribution of obscene
works to mature persons. At least insofar as the processes of national
censorship are concerned, that is a risk which should be borne today.
But when the vendor deliberately stimulates and creates a market for
obscenity by utilizing the obsceneness of his wares as a means to promote
their sale, then the case changes. Again, when the commercial seller
uses the mails to engage in widespread, indiscriminate selling to an
unknown audience, he is creating a ready and more easily accessible
market for precisely those elements of the population who may be
adversely affected, and his conduct becomes dangerous and more so
depending upon the degree to which the materials are obscene. (And
let us recognize that there are certainly degrees of "obsceneness.") So
the conduct element of the standard tentatively advanced here would
have the commercial disseminator of an obscene work use due care to
refrain from any course of commercial conduct which incurs these
risks.'
But to pose a more concrete and recurring problem which may
reflect the difficulty of drawing lines here: When does a disseminator
of a nudist or pin-up magazine or an erotic book become a "commercial
exploiter" of obscenity? Assuming that the work is "obscene" under
lating the Comstock Act affirmed). The history of this case may only be obtained
by reading the record, since no court to adjudicate it deigned to write an opinion.
Gundelfinger, a former teacher at Yale, wrote tracts which he mailed widely, at
his own expense, unsolicited, to Yale students and alumni. These tracts advocated
the value from both a physical and psychic standpoint of practicing, specifically at
Yale, a form of masturbation. Gundelfinger urged Yale students (including the foot-
ball team) in long-winded, scientific or pseudo-scientific terms to join his "crusade.'
Whether his works really were obscene (either as erotic writing or "filthy" writing)
may be a close question. But assumning they were patently obscene, one might question
whether he should have the right to send such pamphlets to Yale students, alumni and
other persons without their permission. Our proposal would prohibit it.
65. Cf. § 207.10(6) of the Model Penal Code which punishes a "person who
advertises or otherwise promotes the sale of material represented or held out by him
to be obscene." The conduct prohibited is described in the comment as "playing on
prurient interest, holding out the promise of forbidden thrills." In this connection
it is interesting to scan some of the full page, illustrated mail order advertisements
for Boccacio's Decameron appearing in many of the "girlie" magazines. Cf. United
States v. Hornick, 229 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1956). See also In re Cadillac Publishing
Co., Hearing Examiner Docket No. 1/244 (1955) for a Post Office ruling imposing
a "mail block" on the Cadillac Publishing Co. on the ground that its mail-order
advertising of its Encyclopedia of Sex, while not obscene, was represented as obscene.
The General Counsel's decision was recently sustained by the District of Columbia
District Court (Holtzoff, J.). See 26 U.S.L. WEEK 2186 (Oct. 15, 1957).
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the tests (as must be the case before we need concern ourselves with
the conduct of the distributor), the question of whether this presents
a case for federal control would still have to turn on analysis of the
cumulative weight of several variables: (a) the degree to which the
materials transcend the law's standard; (b) the extent to which the
disseminator's advertising methods were calculated by appearance,
content and audience solicited to stimulate prurient interest and desire
for the materials; (c) the volume of his distribution of the obscene
work; the volume of his advertising and attempted circulation of it;
(d) the extent to which he has distributed to an unknown audience
which, under the circumstances, may well be made up of adolescents or
susceptible persons; (e) his apparent purpose in engaging in this dis-
tribution of obscenity as reflected by his course of conduct-has the
publisher been indifferent to the risks involved in the circulation in
which he knowingly engaged?
These factors are suggested as separate criteria, each to be
weighed for its worth, in judging whether conduct constitutes "ex-
ploitation." And, it should be re-emphasized that the obscenity must
be found before the question of "commercial exploitation" arises.
Thus the standard suggested is less restrictive than any now in force.
Of course the conduct element is broad and therefore vague. But, for
censorship purposes at least, this new element of vagueness should
hardly increase the danger of undesirable curbs on publishing, book-
selling and reading. Further, the proposal must be judged relatively,
in light of available alternatives.
These proposals (to be explored in more detail in our study) may
be difficult to spell out, initially, but they are surely not novel. The
Model Penal Code, while it does not go quite as far with its proposed
criminal standards as we would in the civil field, plainly seeks to
predicate liability on bad behavior-not just the violation of an ab-
stract standard. Some time ago, Judge Learned Hand struck a similar
theme in a criminal case involving a mail order peddler " and so did
a panel of the court of appeals in Washington, quite recently, when it
reviewed a non-mailability order imposed against a nudist magazine.6
7
And so of course did Chief Justice Warren in Roth and Kingsley.6
66. United States v. Rebuhn, 109 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1940). Cf. United States
v. Levine, 83 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1939).
67. Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 24 U.S.L. Wrzic 2560 (D.C. Cir. May
31, 1956), rev'd en banc, unreported opinion reported in 26 U.S.L. WEK 2169 (D.C.
Cir. Oct. 3, 1957).
68. "That there is a social problem presented by obscenity is attested by the ex-
pression of the legislatures of the forty-eight States as well as the Congress. To
recognize the existence of a problem, however, does not require that we sustain any
and all measures adopted to meet that problem .... Mistakes of the past prove that
there is a strong countervailing interest to be considered in the freedoms guaranteed
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Finally, recurring again to the divisions of the Court in the Roth and
Kingsley cases, it should be emphasized that changes in the substantive
standard-along the line proposed-may be imperative in the interests
of constitutionality.
ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS AND PROPOSALS FOR POSTAL CENSORSHIP
Until quite recently there has been doubt and dispute as to whether
the decision-making process in postal censorship cases should work
through formal, trial-type hearings. Indeed, back in 1940 the Attorney
General's Committee on Administrative Procedures, when studying
the Post Office Department, asked the question: Should the practice
of obscenity censorship be formalized more than it is? Surprisingly,
perhaps, the answer was "no." 6'
Formal hearings would be a waste of time, said the committee.
The only real controversy in these cases has to do with characterization
of the work in question. Is it "obscene"? You answer this question
by inspecting-contemplating-the work and by making your best
personal estimate. What good will a trial with a "parade of witnesses"
do? For sincere witnesses can be found to argue either side of the
question. Obscenity being "largely a question of one's own con-
science," the Government ought to be primarily concerned about whose
conscience will do the deciding, rather than the formalities of procedure.
Thus, the key to good decision-making was a broadly trained "ex-
pert-a man schooled in the arts and sciences who would help the
Department establish overall policies, criteria, and resolve hard cases.
Look at the success of the Bureau of Customs, said the committee. It
holds no hearings. But it does use an "expert" as an advisor. Contro-
versy has been stilled. Do likewise, was the committee's advice to the
Department.70
The Post Office rejected this advice. And within a decade, the
courts, presumably disagreeing with arguments to the effect that hear-
ings were wasteful and useless, began insisting that postal censorship
decisions be rendered through the machinery of administrative trials in
by the first and fourteenth amendments. The line dividing the salacious or porno-
graphic from literature or science is not straight and unwavering .... It is manifest
that the same object may have a different impact, varying according to the part of
the community it reached .... The conduct of the defendant is the central issue, ot
the obscenity of a book or picture. The nature of the materials is, of course, relevant
as an attribute of the defendant's conduct, but the materials are thus placed in context
from which they draw color and character. A wholly different result might be reached
in a different setting." (Emphasis added.) Roth v. United States, 345 U.S. 476, 495
(1957).
69. See THE POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT 29-33, 95. Cf. Judge Arnold's opin-
ion in Walker v. Popenoe: "The determination of whether a publication violates [the
obscenity] standards is certainly one which should not be undertaken without a hear-
ing." 149 F.2d 511, 514 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
70. Tia PosT OvIcg DgPARTMXNT 31, 33, 45.
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contested cases.71 Thus, the prescription of the Attorney General's
Committee-add experts, not trials, to the decision-making process-
has been taken in reverse dosage.
The fact is that both prescriptions seem like good advice. Utiliza-
tion of "literary" or "scientific" "experts" in some cases may be most
helpful to a lawyer who must determine whether a work, about which he
may know very little, meets the elusive definition of obscenity. And
certainly hearings should be essential if a conduct element is made a part
of the censorship standard. "Inspection" " and abstract evaluation of
the materials involved is not enough; just as important are the facts and
legal conclusions to be drawn therefrom, relating to the respondent's
use of the materials. In contested cases these should be adduced via
adversary proceedings.
The more difficult issue today -is whether there should be hearings
first, prior to any stoppage of mail. In 1945, in Walker v. Popenoe,73
the court of appeals held that "due process" of law requires the Depart-
ment to let allegedly obscene mail go through, unless and until the
Department first determines, via formal, trial-type hearings that the
work is "obscene." To the contention that this ruling would com-
pletely frustrate civil enforcement of the Comstock Act, Judge Arnold
replied, in effect: then so be it; the remedy is to use the criminal
sanctions of the statute.
Judge Arnold's admonition went unheeded. The Department
continued to stop suspect mail summarily-even though, on several
occasions, federal judges enjoined postal orders entered pursuant to
this modus operandi.74 But very recently the court of appeals, en
71. See Pike v. Walker, 121 F.2d 37, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1941) ; Walker v. Popenoe, 149
F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1945). Cf. Cates v. Haderlein, 342 U.S. 804 (1951); Door v.
Donaldson, 195 F.2d 764 (D.C. Cir. 1952). But see Justice Douglas' opinion in the
stay proceedings in Standard v. Olesen, 74 Sup. Ct. 768 (1954); Note, Postal Sane-
tions: A Study of the Summary Use of Administrative Power, 31 Ind. L.J. 257
(1956).
72. Cf. Door v. Donaldson, 195 F.2d 764 (D.C. Cir. 1952), holding that the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act's exemption of "proceedings in which decisions rest solely
on inspections," 5 U.S.C. § 1008 (1952), does not apply to postal obscenity determina-
tions.
73. 149 F.2d 511, 514 (D.C. Cir. 1945). The Popenoe rule has, presumably, now
been reappraised by the full bench of the court of appeals in Sunshine Book Co. v.
Summerfield, 26 U.S.L. WrXK 2169 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 3, 1957). See note 1 supra.
74. See DeGrazia, supra note 9, at 610. In recent (December 1955) unreported
litigation, the Post Office directed the local postmaster of Mount Morris, Ill., to hold
up dispatch of a forthcoming issue of Confidential magazine and refer a sample copy
to Washington for inspection. The postmaster complied. The issue was found "ob-
scene." Confidential demanded a hearing on the merits, and pending that hearing, de-
manded that the Department deliver the issue to its subscribers. The district court
granted this relief. More recently, similar unreported cases have been litigated involv-
ing Playboy and Rogue magazines. In each case the publication secured an injunc-
tion prohibiting interference with the mailing until the Department ruled the maga-
zine "obscene" after a formal hearing complying with the Administrative Procedure
Act. Information relative to these cases and pleadings and copies of the court orders
were furnished by counsel for the magazines.
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banc, rendered its decision in Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, and
the status of the Popenoe doctrine is now hard to determine.75
The Sunshine Company is a publisher of nudist magazines, and
thus a perennial opponent of the Department. Some time ago postal
lawyers in Washington determined that forthcoming issues of these
magazines were "obscene," and the local postmaster was told to "with-
hold" them "from dispatch" to subscribers. Sunshine was offered
a prompt hearing under the Administrative Procedure Act, which re-
sulted in entry of a formal decision, exculpating the text and message
of the magazines but finding various pictures of practicing nudists
"obscene"-a violation of the "community standard." Sunshine
went to court to fight the nonmailability order on its merits, to challenge
the constitutionality of the substantive censorship powers exercised by
the Department and also the procedures used to enforce them-particu-
larly the Department's apparent failure to comply with the "due
process" doctrine laid down in Popenoe.
A divided court of appeals, overruling the initial decision of its
panel, upheld the postal order in all respects. The constitutionality of
censorship, exercised (as was the case here) wholly independently of
criminal enforcement was sustained on the assumption that Roth and
Kingsley have settled that issue-with little or no analysis of any
possible constitutional distinction between civil and criminal enforce-
ment of the Comstock Act. The procedures used by the Post Office
to stop mail in transit, pendente lite, were expressly approved; curi-
ously, Judge Danaher, writing for the majority, made no reference
whatsoever to the Popenoe doctrine, neither distinguishing nor over-
ruling it. But the three dissenters did, reasserting their belief in its
wisdom, validity and applicability to the proceedings at hand.
It remains to be seen whether, in light of this decision, Walker v.
Popenoe will become an obsolete relic. Obviously the matter is of
extreme importance.
Indeed, it seems that this so-called "due process" problem-
whether the Constitution permits the Post Office to stop mail sum-
marily, prior to any hearing on the merits of the legality of the mail-
ing-is in part another way of framing the issue of whether civil
enforcement of the Comstock Act squares with first amendment free-
doms. Reappraisal of the Popenoe doctrine ought to proceed in that
context. For if it is assumed that censorship, confined to bans on
certain kinds of illegal circulations is not automatically a violation of
the first amendment, then the procedural requirements of "due process"
75. Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 26 U.S.L. Wz i_ 2169 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 3,
1957). See note 1 .upra.
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should hardly be so inexorable to deny the Government minimal power
to do the job which Congress has legitimately asked it to do.
But "due process" should require that the Post Office keep inter-
ference with mail pendente lite, at a minimum. Obviously holding back
the current issue of a magazine from its subscribers before its pub-
lisher has been given any opportunity whatsoever to defend himself
against the charge that he has violated the law, is a serious matter.
Just as with the substantive standard, so with procedure, a compromise
is needed.
Thus, it is suggested that the Department should not stop delivery
of the mail pendente lite, unless the violation is palpably serious
("seriousness" to be judged by the substantive criteria already sug-
gested) 7 or unless criminal proceedings are initiated contemporaneously
or unless the Department is confronted with a pattern of repeated
violations. At the same time any aggrieved publisher ought to be
given a right to go into court for an injunction restraining temporary
stoppage in cases where the Department has either delayed its hear-
ings unreasonably or in cases where, on the merits, it appears that the
Government has abused its discretion by resort to this special remedy.
Perhaps too, where the Department does seek to stop mail summarily,
pending hearings on the merits, it should be required to initiate pro-
ceedings before its hearing examiner, e.g., in the form of a "show
cause" order, which would establish proof in the nature of "probable
cause" to justify this summary action.
Admittedly all this leaves considerable discretion to the adminis-
trators. At the same time the full rigor of the Popenoe doctrine must
be modified if the Post Office is to have a non-mailability sanction at
all. The courts could develop the flexible approach suggested above, in
the absence of statutory change, indeed perhaps better without statutory
change. And the Sunshine decision hardly forecloses this evolution.
Rather it invites it.
Which introduces another question: What should be the scope of
judicial review in postal cases? There is language in some of the
cases to the effect that the courts ought only to set aside postal censor-
ship orders where there has been an "abuse of discretion." 77 This view
seems wrong,78 particularly if a conduct element is to be put into the
76. See text at note 65 supra. Compare Pub. L. No. 821, 84th Cong., 2d Sess.
§ 755 (July 27, 1956) which deals with the "mail block" sanction (amending 39
U.S.C. § 259(a) (1952)) and which authorizes impounding pendente lite non-copy-
righted materials after special notice and interlocutory hearings at the administrative
level.
77. See, e.g., Roth v. Goldman, 172 F.2d 788 (2d Cir. 1949).
78. Cf. Parmelee v. United States, 113 F.2d 729, 731 (D.C. Cir. 1940); ALl,
op. cit. supra note 43, at 46.
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substantive standard. Perhaps the agency's findings on purely factual
matters-for example, the fact of mailing, the size and nature of the
audience circularized-should stand where the record adduced at the
administrative hearing supports them. But not its conclusions on the
"obsceneness" of the challenged work, or whether mail distribution,
under the circumstances, would be illegal. As Justice Brennan's ma-
jority opinion in the Roth case makes clear, the validity of anti-
obscenity laws is in part dependent on the fact that the courts can
practice "ceaseless vigilance" to make sure that the standards are not
abused.79
Indeed, in view of the precarious validity of censorship under the
first amendment, it seems desirable, not only that court review be
de novo, but that publishers be entitled to a jury trial if they so wish.
While from a statistical viewpoint it is nonsense to say that a jury's
verdict reflects the sense of a community, it is at least true that adding
the jury trial ingredient increases the potential braking power of the
law to stop abuses. If the objective is to confine censorship to the
more serious cases, then civil enforcement should be virtually as ac-
countable to the courts as is criminal enforcement. Unfortunately the
proposal for jury trials on review of postal cases, unlike others put
forth here, would seem to require new enabling legislation.
Another administrative problem relates to the mail block sanction,
an indispensable weapon of postal censorship. Aside from criminal
prosecution there is no other way to deal, effectively, with the com-
mercial peddler of obscenity who sends both his "come-ons" and his
wares under the privacy of the seal." At the same time the possibilities
for agency abuse of this sanction are obvious. Unless this postal power
is limited, sedentary, responsible enterprises can in theory be threatened
with business failure on the basis of a single mailing deemed unlawful,
and this via an administrative proceeding-a glaring form of "prior
restraint." 1 The revised substantive standard suggested above should
79. Roth v. United States, 345 U.S. 476 (1957).
80. Postal officials cannot and do not open sealed, first class mail without search
warrants. This is a fourth amendment limitation. Ex parte Jackson, 79 U.S. 727
(1878). See 18 U.S.C. § 1717 (1952). On the importance of the "mail block" sanction
as a weapon of civil anti-obscenity enforcement, see the Government's petitions for
certiorari to the Supreme Court in Summerfield v. Sunshine Book Co., No. 655, 1954
Term; Summerfield v. Tourlanes Publishing Co., No. 347, 1956 Term; letter of the
Postmaster General in support of enactment of 39 U.S.C. § 259a (1952), reprinted in
S. REP. No. 2179, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950).
81. Compare the "prior restraint" problems in connection with revoking per-
manent second class mail permits. See the dissents of Holmes and Brandeis in Mil-
waukee Publishing Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 417, 436 (1921).
While use of the mail block sanction has largely been confined to mail-order
business in pictorial matter, the sanction can be used against books. See Cadillac
Publishing Co. v. Summerfield, 227 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (involving an encyclo-
OBSCENITY IN THE MAILS
help to control use of the mail block sanction. So, too, court insistence
on formal administrative proceedings should deter hasty, ill considered
action. But there is also the matter of the scope of the remedy.
Ideally, the mail block sanction should be confined to stoppage of
only incoming mail related to dissemination of the "obscene" matter.
There should be no interference with the continued publication and
distribution of any non-obscene work. A bookseller should not be
deprived of all mail delivery just because one book he sells is "obscene."
The courts, of course, beginning with an earlier Sunshine Magazine
case (not to be confused with the very recent decision discussed above)
have so interpreted the mail block statute, apparently to save its con-
stitufionality.'s
But this rule (stop only incoming mail "related to" the illegal dis-
tribution) is easier to state than to enforce in practice. It seems
administratively impossible to screen and segregate most first class
mail this way. And a hard problem is what to do about the incoming
mail of a dealer in obscene pictures who also conducts-but only as
a "front" operation-a mail order business in innocuous matter. For
example many "stag" movie distributors, advertising for mail order
customers in "girlie" magazines, purport to sell "family" and "chil-
dren's" movies as well as films "for men only." A pin-up magazine
is an unlikely place to find customers for movies for tots, and judging
from the tone and emphasis of many ads, it is doubtful if many of these
distributors are really in business to serve the very young, rather than
the prurient.
In cases of this sort, where the Government proves as part of its
case that a substantial segment of the offender's merchandise is obscene
matter, perhaps the answer is to permit the Post Office to hold up
all mail except that which, on the face, of the envelope, is presumptively
unrelated to the illegal enterprise, e.g., at the same time, in such a case,
pedia of sex). The Department, in 1949, found Gershorn Legman's Love and Death
obscene, and brought proceedings which forced Legman to abandon a publishing busi-
ness set up to sell it. An Oklahoma politician ("Cowboy Pink" Williams) was put
out of business in 1953 when he attempted to sell a postcard with this message: "Cat-
tlemen's Convention and Public Ass-Kicking-All Day Picnic at the head of Salt
Creek the day after you are foreclosed. All cattlemen who voted for Ike will have
their ass kicked free and all the crow they can eat." Information on these cases de-
rived from files of American Civil Liberties Union in New York; see also In re
Pink, Hearing Examiner Docket No. 2/207 for the Post Office record of this case;
Williams v. Petty, 136 F. Supp. 283 (E.D. Okla. 1953) (does not deal with merits).
82. See Summerfield v. Sunshine Co., 221 F.2d 42 (D.C. Cir. 1954), cert. denied,
349 U.S. 921 (1955); Tourlanes Publishing Co. v. Summerfield, 231 F.2d 773 (D.C.
Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 912 (1956) ; Glanzman v. Finkle, 150 F. Supp. 823
(S.D.N.Y. 1957). As these cases indicate, the Department has found it very difficult
to comply with the Sunshine rule. (And see the petitions for certiorari in Sunshine and
Tourlanes, supra note 80). Until very recently, despite its reiteration in Tourlanes, the
practice was to hold up all mail except mail which on its face was not related to the
unlawful enterprise.
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the addressee could be given the alternative of (1) appearing at the
post office and opening and withdrawing mail discovered to be unrelated
to the obscenity enterprise, or (2) signing an affidavit pledging
discontinuance (or temporary discontinuance, pending further liti-
gation) of the illegal activity. The only other course of action seems to
be strict enforcement of the Sunshine rule on mail blocks. But this
means that the mail block sanction might well become useless and
censorship impotent to do its job. And if, we assume, as it now is the
case, that criminal sanctions are not enough to control existing, nox-
ious mail order commerce in obscenity, then some leeway must be left
to the Department to use the necessary civil sanctions.
Finally, one more proposal relating to the administration of postal
censorship: The Department should let the public know more about
what it is doing. Today no one can learn much about the scope of
the operation unles he consults formidable files in the hearing exam-
iner's office (which are open to public inspection), or secures per-
mission to consult the solicitor's non-mailability files (which are con-
fidential). There is too much at stake here, too much controversy
and misunderstanding to permit any sort of "secrecy"-even secrecy
which is not at all contrived by the Government. This is especially
true when we recognize that we are dealing with law which is in a
state of flux, concepts which have been subject to rapid change over
the past two or three decades. A full disclosure of what goes on,
possible by means of full elaboration in the Postmaster General's
Annual Report would seem in order.
A SUGGESTED APPROACH TO CUSTOMS CENSORSHIP
The proposals advanced have thus far dealt only with postal
censorship. Customs enforcement of the Tariff Act must be considered
apart. For foreign "exploiters" present a serious problem-both in
terms of the erotic or pornographic nature of the works they offer
and in terms of the ease with which they could reach the United States
market if left uncontrolled. The rub is that these disseminators are
beyond the reach of our laws. Direct action cannot be taken against
them, and the only effective way to stop foreign commercial exploita-
tion-assuming it is to be stopped-is to screen all obscenity coming
into the country. Unfortunately this results in precisely the kind of
total censorship which has been criticized herein-for example, denial
of Lady Chatterly to mature adult readers. However, that result might
be tempered if the Tariff Law's existing loophole-discretionary re-
leases-were widened by liberalization of the standards and procedures
for release.
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Here are some changes which might well be beneficial. Some,
unfortunately, would require new legislation.
(a) Exercise of the release power through procedures fairer to
importers. This would probably encourage more petitions and more
releases. A basic reform, which requires no legislation, would be
simply, to notify importers of their right to petition for release, giving
full explanation of what the law allows.' Indeed, it seems hard to
justify the present failure to supply such notice. There should also
be the right to a hearing-a chance for the importer to appear personally
and defend his claim to exemption. The precise degree of formality
which should attend these hearings may be a matter of doubt but at
the very least the importer should be entitled to counsel and witnesses,
and be allowed to introduce evidence. The decision itself, and the
reasons to support it, should be a matter of public record.
(b) The present administrative interpretation of the tariff statute
to the effect that the work must have established recognition in this
country should be revised. This has resulted in refusals to permit
entry of rare orientalia of the works of American authors like Henry
Miller. It seems indefensible that mature Americans can't study litera-
ture or art which is accepted (and perhaps even widely praised) for
its merit in other cultures or countries.
(c) Broaden the concept of what constitutes a work of "merit."
The probable intent behind the existing exemption was to promote
study of books and works of art for literary, educational or scientific
purposes regardless of their obscenity. That intent should be effec-
tuated, either by legislative amendment or by administrative interpre-
tation of the existing release power. The point is that "merit" should
be judged in light of the purpose for which the work is imported. If
a book has value to an importer's interests, and if these interests are
not harmful, then release it to him."4
(d) Any adult with a mature interest in the work should have
standing to petition for release. The Bureau, as noted, seems to stress
special, formal, for example, scholarly, credentials. But it should be
83. When the Bureau detains an import on grounds of its alleged obscenity, the
importer is notified by the collector and asked to sign an enclosed assent to forfeiture
of the materials. Forms for these "notices" vary locally, but none really advise the
importer of his rights: (1) to a court proceeding, de novo, with the right to jury trial
with burden of proof on the Government. (This court proceeding is required by the
Tariff Act of 1930, 46 STAT. 688, 19 U.S.C. § 1305(a) (1952)) ; (2) to petition the
Secretary of Treasury, in his discretion, to release the work. See notes 22 and 29
.supra.
84. See note 31 supra. Cf. United States v. One Unbound Volume. 128 F. Supp.
280 (D. Md. 1955) (Seizure of a folio of plates and pictures depicting Roman and
Etruscan vases, some of which were decorated with erotic drawings upheld by district
court on the ground that these pictures, if displayed publicly, would violate the "coin-
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enough that the petitioner furnish credible assurance of his maturity,
and a plausible explanation of his motivation for purchasing the work.
This explanation should be judged in the context of the nature of the
obscene work. It would obviously take a lot more to justify release of
pure pornography, though special cases justifying this can be con-
jured-e.g., Kinsey's. On the other hand it ought not to take much to
justify release, to a mature adult, of a work like Lady Chatterly, or a
rare edition of the Decameron seized because of its illustrations.
(e) The law now says no releases of "commercial" importations.
This is too broad; it smacks of the "universal" blanket ban, condemned
so vigorously by Justice Harlan. A reputable bookstore importing
limited quantities of Lady Chatterly ought to be allowed to do so.
After all, the store's subsequent reselling of the work can be policed.
The prospect of harm here is certainly slight, especially if the importer
furnishes, by affidavit, credible statements explaining why the work is
to be imported, how and to whom he expects to sell it.
(f) Release of movies, imported commercially by bona-fide dis-
tributors, should be permitted. Indeed, there is a serious problem as
to whether the United States should go on censoring foreign movies
at all. Of course, obscene commercial movies can be commercially
exploited. But whatever exploitation goes on, goes on quite in the
open. And state and local law enforcement should be able to handle
this problem without Uncle Sam's censorial help. Granting that exist-
ing federal censorship is now kept at a minimum, it also is true that
standards for judging "obsceneness" in movies can often be most diffi-
cult to apply. The Bureau today cuts out scenes which it thinks offend
some community standard on acceptability. It assumes a single
national standard, but pretty clearly there is none, for acceptability in
movies may vary, not only from place to place, but-depending on
which theatres exhibit the film and how they advertise it-whether the
film's "obsceneness" is exploited or treated with discretion. Moreover,
while the impact of customs censorship today is very slight, there is
no assurance that tomorrow's officials will be so tolerant. At least
when a reputable importer brings in a film which has some aritistic
backing, it would seem that the need for Bureau scissoring is not so
overriding that a reputable importing distributor, given a warning,
shouldn't be allowed to take his chances with enforcement of local laws.
munity standard." Actually the plates were consigned to an amateur anthropologist
who, prior to the court case, had requested a special exception. The Bureau, without
disclosing its reasons or inviting any further showing by way of a more formal "peti-
tion" for release, refused to release the work. Supplemental information including
copies of correspondence to and from the Bureau has been furnished by the importer
who appeared pro se in all proceedings).
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(g) The Bureau's refusal to release should also be reviewable in
the courts-just as its seizures are-both to insure against the obvious
possibility of abuse and to provide an incentive to the Bureau to be
liberal about using it.
(h) Finally-and most important: There should be full dis-
closure to the public at large about the Bureau's censorship operations.
Today, the Bureau suppresses this information on the grounds that
some of the more prurient among us might get curious and attempt to
import books which we have ruled obscene. But the names of many of
these books could probably be obtained if one is curious enough to
make the inquiry. The Library of Congress makes some of this "ob-
scenity" available to the public. But more to the point: this
secrecy is undemocratic. Grant that today Bureau enforcement
of the Tariff Act is conscientious, careful and perhaps praiseworthy.
Who is to say what will happen tomorrow? Moreover, closing the
censorship records to public inspection shuts off information which
is essential to rational investigation of the desirability of the operation.
Not only should these records be open to reasonable inspection, but the
essential information should be made more available to the public, per-
haps through the Secretary of Treasury's Annual Report.
Even with all these proposals, the release power poses vexing
questions. The trouble of course, is that there are few objective stand-
ards to guide those who must make the decisions. And just as Senator
Johnson ridiculed the exemption when Senator Smoot first proposed it
back in 1930, so it is easy to sneer at proposals for making the loop-
hole bigger.
But, if one accepts the basic principles for a compromise solution
to the problem of obscenity which are the underlying premises of this
proposal, the overriding question becomes: are any of the other an-
swers to the importation problem more acceptable? The only alterna-
tive is abolishing control of all private importation. That may well
be a worthwhile, long-range goal. But it is probably unrealistic today.
At least broadening the release power should be attempted as an ex-
perimental, evolutionary step. The pending litigation between Indiana
University and the United States Government over seizure of Professor
Kinsey's research material may well force reappraisal and a more
flexible program. The proposals above would permit greater freedom
to read, greater freedom of access to books of one's choice and, at the
same time, permit continued government surveillance of importation
to check noxious foreign commercial exploitation within our borders.
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